holding that “in determining whether a particular collateral felony is inherently dangerous to human life so as to justify a charge of felony murder under [the Kansas felony murder statute], the elements of the collateral felony should be viewed in the abstract, and the circumstances of the commission of the felony should not be considered in making the determination”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “in determining whether a particular collateral felony is inherently dangerous to human life so as to justify a charge of felony murder under [the Kansas felony murder statute], the elements of the collateral felony should be viewed in the abstract, and the circumstances of the commission of the felony should not be considered in making the determination”
- stating that unlawful possession of a firearm, when viewed in the abstract, is not a felony inherently dangerous to human life and would not sustain conviction for murder in the first degree under felony murder rule
- holding that the unlawful possession of a firearm by an ex-felon when viewed in the abstract is not inherently dangerous to human life
- "[F]iling a charge under the felony murder rule in most, if not all, cases removes any possibility of establishing the defense of self-defense. . . . [T]he defendant when charged with felony murder is not entitled to an instruction on self- defense."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Schroeder, C.J.,
dissenting. State v. Moffitt, 199 Kan. 514 , 431 P.2d 879 (1967), has been the law of Kansas for thirteen years. The court now reverses its position on the law in that case regarding felony murder, where the underlying felony is the unlawful possession of a firearm proscribed by K.S.A. 21-4204(1)(6).
I would adhere to the law in the Moffitt decision.
Miller and McFarland, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.