concluding that California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which provides right of action but is silent as to remedy, authorizes punitive damages award in light of Cal. Civil Code § 3294 , under which punitive damages are authorized in noncontract cases unless "a contrary legislative intent appears"
How later courts described this case
- concluding that California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which provides right of action but is silent as to remedy, authorizes punitive damages award in light of Cal. Civil Code § 3294 , under which punitive damages are authorized in noncontract cases unless "a contrary legislative intent appears"
- “[I]n a civil action under the FEHA, all relief generally available in 21 noncontractual actions, including punitive damages, may be obtained.”
- right to sue under California discrimination statute “surely is ‘limited,’ in the sense that extensive administrative procedures are a precondition to its accrual”
- “[F]or the breach of an obligation not arising from contract,” punitive damages may be recovered [only] “where the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (quoting Cal. Civil Code § 3294 (a))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MOSK, J.
I concur in the order and in the opinion with one exception: I do not deem it appropriate to refer, for any purpose, to legislators’ letters expressing their understanding of legislative intent.
It is unfortunate that in California we do not have the equivalent of the Congressional Record. Thus, we lack the ability to glean from verbatim floor debates a common denominator or consensus reflecting views on a measure under consideration. The journal required of each house by the Constitution (art. IV, § 7, subd. (b)) does not serve this purpose. On occasion we do have some minimal history in published committee reports, legislative counsel analyses, and in the case of initiative measures the publically distributed explanation of proponents. But other than those occasionally helpful indicia of legislative intent we are necessarily confined to the four corners of the statute.
One legislator may express his opinion on the purpose and limitations of a pending proposal. But he—even if the author of the measure— represents only 1/120th of the whole Legislature. He cannot possibly know the subjective intent of other members of the two houses who supported the bill. For that reason I am convinced no court should lend any credence to a legislator’s letter, expansive or limited, regarding a legislative enactment.
My views on this subject are consistent with the court’s unanimous opinion in In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583 [ 128 Cal.Rptr. 427 , 546 P.2d 1371 ], in which it was held (at pp. 589-590) that “In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or understandings of individual legislators who cast their votes in favor of it. *222 [Citations.] Nor do we carve an exception to the principle simply because the legislator whose motives are proferred [sic] actually authored the bill in controversy [citation]; no guarantee can issue that those who supported his proposal shared his view of its compass.” There are many similar rulings by appellate courts (see e.g., Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc. v. City of Pittsburg (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 983, 1006 [ 124 Cal.Rptr. 698 ]; Bauman v. Islay Investments (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 797 [ 119 Cal.Rptr. 681 ].) The best example of the futility of employing communications from individual legislators is Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 257-258 [ 104 Cal.Rptr. 761 , 502 P.2d 1049 ], in which two legislators offered distinctly contrary opinions on the intent of the Legislature in enacting a statute. (Also see Larcher v. Wanless (1976) 18 Cal.3d 646, 654 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 75, 557, 507 ].)
The majority in the instant case are ill-served by any reference to one legislator’s opinion.
Reynoso, J., concurred. .