observing that a “witness’ motivation for testifying is always of undeniable relevance and a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any fact that may have influenced the witness’ testimony”
How later courts described this case
- observing that a “witness’ motivation for testifying is always of undeniable relevance and a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any fact that may have influenced the witness’ testimony”
- “[a] witness’ motivation for testifying is always of undeniable relevance and a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider any fact that may have influenced the witness’ testimony”
- “A robber or other wrongdoer engaged in felonious conduct has no privilege of self-defense . . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Fitzgerald, P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In this case, accomplice and eyewitness Dwayne Cordell initially invoked his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. After being granted absolute immunity by the prosecutor, Cordell agreed to testify. The trial court, however, granted the prosecutor’s motion in limine to prevent defendant from cross-examining Cordell with regard to the grant of immunity that influenced his decision to testify.
The credibility of a witness is an issue "of the utmost importance” in every case. People v Love, 43 Mich App 608, 613 ; 204 NW2d 714 (1972). Evidence of a witness’ bias or interest in a case is highly relevant to his credibility. Id. Because of the undeniable relevance of evidence of a witness’ motivation for testifying, the prosecutor has a duty, upon request of defense counsel, to disclose to the jury the fact that immunity or a plea to á reduced charge has been granted to the testifying accomplice. People v Atkins, 397 Mich 163, 173-174 ; 243 NW2d 292 (1976); People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 654 ; 516 NW2d 520 (1994). The disclosure requirement may be considered satisfied where the jury is made well aware of such facts by means of thorough and probing cross-examination by defense counsel. Atkins, supra at 174 .
In People v Mumford, 183 Mich App 149, 153 ; 455 NW2d 51 (1990), a panel of this Court summarized the importance of cross-examination:
Cross-examination is arguably the most effective, and sometimes the only, tool a defendant has to defend against the charges brought against him. Cross-examination is so critical to a defendant’s defense that it is considered the "primary interest *692 secured by the confrontation clause, [US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20].” [People v Holliday, 144 Mich App 560, 567 ; 376 NW2d 154 (1985)]. In People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486, 499-500 ; 251 NW 594 (1933), the Michigan Supreme Court explained that "[o]ne of the elementary principles of cross-examination is that the party having the right to cross-examine has a right to draw out from the witness and lay before the jury anything tending . . . [to] affect the credibility of the witness.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, "a limitation on cross-examination which prevents [defendant] from placing before the jury facts from which bias, prejudice or lack of credibility of a prosecution witness might be inferred constitutes denial of the [constitutional] right of confrontation.” United States v Garrett, 542 F2d 23, 25 (CA 6, 1976), emphasis added; Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 317-318 ; 94 S Ct 1105 ; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974). [Citations omitted.]
Immunity received in return for testimony is undeniably a fact that is relevant to a witness’ credibility. Restricting cross-examination regarding the grant of immunity to a witness deprives the defendant of his constitutional right to confrontation. I find this result unacceptable and agree with the majority that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the prosecutor’s motion to limit defendant’s cross-examination regarding the grant of immunity. Mumford, supra at 154 .
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the error was harmless. In my opinion, denial of the opportunity to exercise a right fundamental to our criminal process is so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that it never can be regarded as harmless. People v Robinson, 386 Mich 551 ; 194 NW2d 709 (1972). See People v Mobley, 390 Mich 57, 65-66 ; 210 NW2d 327 (1973) (a codefendant invoked the privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination after freely testifying on direct; the Supreme Court *693 found that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him and that the error was not harmless despite the sufficiency of the evidence to show the defendant guilty beyond any reasonable doubt). I find the Court’s language in Mobley enlightening and equally applicable in situations where the defendant’s ability to cross-examine a witness regarding immunity or a plea to a reduced charge is restricted by the trial court:
[I]t is strange indeed to permit the witness to damn defendant on direct examination and then refuse to have such testimony and the credibility of the witness tested by a vigorous cross-examination. Such an error negates the theory of the adversary process. Such an error cannot be permitted to pass uncorrected.
Not only a right fundamental to any accused person is involved, but jurisprudence important to the state. [Id. at 66.]
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.