holding that the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance may be considered in a robbery-murder case
How later courts described this case
- holding that the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance may be considered in a robbery-murder case
- “Counsel is permitted to argue the facts which have been presented . . . .”
- noting counsel may argue facts in evidence and inferences which may be drawn from those facts, but counsel is prohibited from arguing facts not supported by evidence
- in senteaicing defendant convicted under robbery-felony-murder theory, use of pecuniary gain aggravating factor does not violate eighth amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Waring, 364 N.C. 443 (2010)
317 N.C. at 481-83, 346 S.E.2d at 410-11, that case is distinguishable.
The opinion
Justice Billings
concurring in result.
When Williams I (State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394 , 284 S.E. 2d 437 (1981)) was decided by this Court, I was not a member of the Court and did not participate in the decision that the prosecution had “presented absolutely no evidence whatsoever which showed that Ms. Pierce’s killing was motivated by a desire to eliminate a potential witness.” 317 N.C. 474, 482 , 346 S.E. 2d 405, 410 . Because my review of the record on this appeal and of Williams I, unaided by oral argument, does not convince me that submission of the aggravating factor disapproved in Williams I was error, I concur only on the basis that the prior decision of this Court is the law of the case, binding upon the prosecution at the second sentencing hearing. Because the prosecutor clearly violated the mandate of this Court that the jury should not be allowed to consider as an aggravating factor that the victim was murdered in order to prevent her from identifying the robbers, I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the trial judge erred to the defendant’s prejudice in failing to intervene ex mero motu, and the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this concurring opinion.