holding that defendant’s medication was not involuntary because he did not move to terminate the administration of medication, or otherwise assert that he was being medicated involuntarily
How later courts described this case
- holding that defendant’s medication was not involuntary because he did not move to terminate the administration of medication, or otherwise assert that he was being medicated involuntarily
- holding that the court was not required to conduct an inquiry into whether medication of defendant during trial was involuntary where defendant did not raise the issue
- trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to investigate sleeping juror where defense counsel did not request a hearing or further investigation into the matter
- “What’s going on?”, combined 'with a willingness to speak with detectives
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*1385 MOSK, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
I concur in the judgment in all respects save one. I would vacate the sentence of death as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of California Constitution because trial counsel introduced none of the available mitigating evidence. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 449-450 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301 , 916 P.2d 1000 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [implying that any sentence of death should be vacated as unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 if trial counsel introduced none of the available mitigating evidence]; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 501-502 [ 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525 , 907 P.2d 373 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; In re Ross (1995) 10 Cal.4th 184, 216, fn. 1 [ 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 544 , 892 P.2d 1287 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 835 [ 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394 , 889 P.2d 588 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same], reiterating People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1074 [ 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 846 P.2d 756 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.), revd. sub nom. Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 [ 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 ] (per curiam); People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 577 [ 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353 , 834 P.2d 1171 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; see also People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1197 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ] (cone, and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [finding a sentence of death unreliable under the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17 when trial counsel introduced none of the available mitigating evidence, albeit at the defendant’s request]; People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 531-533 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ] (dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1059-1062 [ 264 Cal.Rptr. 386 , 782 P.2d 627 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [same]; People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 1158-1161 [ 245 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 751 P.2d 901 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.) [to similar effect under the Eighth Amendment]; People v. Deere (1985) 41 Cal.3d 353, 360-368 [ 222 Cal.Rptr. 13 , 710 P.2d 925 ] [same].)
If I had to reach the issue, I would conclude that the trial court erred reversibly when it granted defendant’s motion to represent himself at the penalty phase—which was, in effect, a “request to prosecute the case for death” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1236 [ 259 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 774 P.2d 698 ] (conc. and dis. opn. of Mosk, J.)).
Appellant’s petition for a rehearing was denied September 17, 1997.