stating “natural increment” in value of property does not, standing alone, constitute prejudice for purposes of laches doctrine
How later courts described this case
- stating “natural increment” in value of property does not, standing alone, constitute prejudice for purposes of laches doctrine
- imposing a purchase money resulting trust on land purchased by father, but purchased with borrowed funds from son, and title held in son’s name
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WADE, Justice
I concur.
However, I have grave doubts that the evidence is clear and convincing that the deed to Eugene was intended as a mortgage. This is a field in which different minds in many cases violently disagree. There are no standards by which this question can be definitely determined. The only standard which aids the court in determining this question is whether the finding that the evidence is clear and convinc *272 ing is reasonable in view of all the evidence. Such standard is very indefinite, for a finding which is reasonable to one person is often unreasonable to others.
In this case what seems reasonable to the trial judge and a majority of the court does not seem so reasonable to me. From a reading of the evidence it seems to me more probable that this property was purchased for Eugene than for his father. There are a lot of undisputed circumstances which, to me, so indicate. However, since the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses, and a majority of this court agree that this evidence is clear and convincing, I concur with the main opinion in its treatment of the quantum of proof required.