trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to further inquire into jury misconduct where the allegation was based on one anonymous telephone call
How later courts described this case
- trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to further inquire into jury misconduct where the allegation was based on one anonymous telephone call
- regarding the standard of review for Rule 404(b)
- reviewing evidence admitted under Rule 404(b)
- “[T]he similarities simply must tend to support a reasonable inference that the same person committed both the earlier and later acts.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Judge Smith
concurring in result.
I disagree with that portion of the majority opinion addressing N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999) (Rule 404(b)). In relevant part, Rule 404(b) states:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.
As noted by the majority, “such evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant to any fact or issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the crime" (emphasis added). I believe the evidence at issue herein elicited from defendant’s ex-wives is relevant only to defendant’s propensity to commit the crime, and I therefore disagree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds such evidence is admissible.
The trial court’s findings stated that the evidence offered by defendant’s ex-wives “indicates and reveals that at the time of the break-up of every marriage that the [defendant . . . has acted violently . . . upon receiving information from his spouse as to the said break-up.” Defendant’s first wife, Carolyn Aldridge, testified that near the end of their marriage in 1981 defendant “smacked” her four or five times and fired two shots from a pistol in her direction. Defendant’s second wife, Elaine Coffey, testified that approximately two years after their 1983 marriage, defendant threw rocks at her and pointed a pistol at her when asked to leave her home.
The victim in this case, defendant’s third wife, was stabbed eleven times on 17 May 1997. Simply put, the incidents involving defendant’s ex-wives are not “sufficiently similar” to the murder in question as to *720 be relevant to any factor other than defendant’s propensity towards violence. State v. West, 103 N.C. App. 1, 9 , 404 S.E.2d 191, 197 (1991) (test of admissibility is whether prior incidents are “sufficiently similar and not so remote as to run afoul of the balancing test between probative value and prejudicial effect set out in” N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1999)). Further, the incidents occurred over twelve years before the commission of the murder at issue, thus bringing into question whether the prejudicial effect of the ex-wives’ testimony outweighs its probative value. See id.
Walker, J. cites State v. Parker, 113 N.C. App. 216, 224 , 438 S.E.2d 745, 750-51 (1994) for the proposition that “[e]vidence of prior behavior following a rejection in a romantic relationship is admissible to prove motive and identity.” However, in that case, Ms. Thomas, the witness offering the evidence in question, and Ms. Welborn, the murder victim,
had rejected defendant in a relationship, [after which] defendant kept both women under constant surveillance; threatened to kill both women; threatened to commit suicide over both women; ran both women off the road with his vehicle; pulled weapons on both women; . . . stabbed Ms. Thomas,
id. at 225 , 438 S.E.2d at 751 ; and shot and killed Ms. Welborn. The incident with Ms. Thomas took place five years before Ms. Welborn was murdered. Id. In the instant case, the incidents involving defendant’s ex-wives and the victim took place over twelve years apart, and there are no similarities between the incidents other than defendant’s general violent tendencies on learning of a break-up. Though the majority attempts to use the ex-wives’ testimony to show identity, I believe the similarities are completely insufficient for this purpose.
Notwithstanding, I do not believe the trial court’s error was so prejudicial to defendant that a different result would have been reached had the error not occurred. See N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1999) (in order for error to be prejudicial, there must be a “reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached”); see also State v. Jolly, 332 N.C. 351, 363 , 420 S.E.2d 661, 668 (1992) (though improper to admit evidence under Rule 404, error was not prejudicial to defendant). I therefore concur in the result.
Judge Timmons-Goodson joins in the concurring opinion.