affirming denial based on two reasons “bear[ing] upon the probability of . . . successfully completing parole”
How later courts described this case
- affirming denial based on two reasons “bear[ing] upon the probability of . . . successfully completing parole”
- noting even generic reasons for denial of parole “minimally compl[ies] with the statutory requirements”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GERBER, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in part.
While I concur in the other results reached by the majority, I write separately because, in my view, the Board of Pardons and Paroles here fails to provide the precise reasons for parole denial required by Arizona law. A.R.S. § 31-412(A) requires the board to determine if the parole candidate will “remain at liberty without violating the law.” The statute thus entails some prognosis of an inmate’s potential for future lawful behavior. The companion statute, A.R.S. § 31-411(F), requires “individualized” reasons for parole denial. The two reasons given by the board for parole denial in this and every other case in my experience in the past several years, namely “seriousness of the offense and age of the victim,” are generic and fixed in the past. These reasons are neither individualized nor responsive to the statutory query about future lawful behavior.
The federal courts remind us that these statutory requirements cannot be taken lightly. In Parker v. Corrothers, 750 F.2d 653 (8th Cir.1984), the court found that a parole denial requires more than “boilerplate” generalities. Id. at 662 . A parole board’s use of “boilerplate” reasons in denials is “tantamount to no reason at all” without consideration of an inmate’s individual situation. United States ex rel. Scott v. Ill. Parole and Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1982). State courts, other than ours, are making similar holdings. Gilmore v. Kan. Parole Bd., 243 Kan. 173, 176 , 756 P.2d 410, 413 (1988).
The parole board’s practice of re-stating the reasons upheld in Cooper, supra, is understandable but inadequate. Nothing in Cooper suggests that the reasons upheld in that case would fit all parole denials. Indeed, these rationalizations could not possibly apply to all parole denials since they must satisfy the statute’s requirement for “individualized” reasons. Put simply, repeating in other cases the reasons for parole denial upheld uniquely in Cooper violates the statutory requirement for reasons tailored to each parole candidate.
In this respect alone, I would remand to the parole board with instructions to comply with A.R.S. § 31-411 and -412.