holding that a “verdict of murder in the first degree on a theory of a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is proper only if the slayer killed as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as a [deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and steadily” (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)
How later courts described this case
- holding that a “verdict of murder in the first degree on a theory of a wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing is proper only if the slayer killed as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations; as a [deliberate judgment or plan; carried on coolly and steadily” (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations omitted)
- recognizing that the California Legislature did not intend to give "deliberate" and "premeditated" meaning other than their ordinary dictionary meanings
- surveying state law and noting that “directly plunging a lethal weapon into the chest evidences a deliberate intention to kill”
- noting that evidence of a preconceived design coupled with a motive is sufficient to sustain first-degree murder verdict
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SULLIVAN, J.
I dissent. I agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Burke insofar as it concludes that there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict of first degree murder on the theory that the homicide was committed by defendant in the performance of, or the attempt to perpetrate, an offense proscribed by Penal Code section 288. Having reached such conclusion, I am of the view as is Justice Burke, that we are not required to uphold the verdict on the additional theory of deliberate and premeditated murder. Indeed I would join his dissenting opinion were it not for the fact that, while deeming it unnecessary to rest the verdict on a theory of deliberate and premeditated murder, the author nevertheless comments on the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict on such theory. I am not disposed to reach this question.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 22, 1969. Peek, J., * sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself disqualified. McComb, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.