concluding that appellate review was automatically preserved when the prosecutor passed less than a full panel of twelve replacement jurors to the defendant during jury selection and thereby violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(f) (2003)
How later courts described this case
- concluding that appellate review was automatically preserved when the prosecutor passed less than a full panel of twelve replacement jurors to the defendant during jury selection and thereby violated N.C.G.S. § 15A-1214(f) (2003)
- requiring a defendant "to show how the identified statutory violation [concerning the jury selection process] prejudiced his case"-that is, how "the aberrant procedure resulted in a biased jury, an inability to question the prospective jurors, an interference with his right to challenge, or any other defect without which a different result might have been reached."
- affirming trial court's determination that defendant was not in "custody" when defendant was transported to police station at his own request, defendant was told he was not under arrest, defendant was free to move around police station unescorted, and he was interviewed by unarmed officer
- noting that structural error is a “rare form of constitutional error” resulting from a defect in the trial process that necessarily renders a trial fundamentally unfair
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice EDMUNDS
concurring.
Although I agree with the premise of the dissent that North Carolina’s procedures and case law relating to a bill of particulars contain more promise than substance, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion here. Defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars made three requests. First, he asked for the date and time of the victim’s death. There is no indication that defendant did not receive this information. Second, defendant asked for “[t]he basis for prosecution of the Defendant for first degree murder, that is, whether the State relies on the felony murder rule, on the existence of premeditation, deliberation, and intent to kill, or on some other theory in seeking conviction of the Defendant for first degree murder.” The record indicates that defendant at trial was aware that the prosecution was proceeding under the theories both of felony murder and of premeditation and deliberation. Finally, defendant asked that the prosecution set out “[t]he aggravating circumstances the State contends are present in this case in order to justify the death penalty.” *430 Under the facts here, the only aggravating circumstance that might implicate felony murder is set out in N.C.G.S. § I5A-2000(e)(5). This circumstance arises where “[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged ... in the commission of . . . any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (2003). While the felony underlying a felony murder conviction can also serve as an aggravating circumstance where a defendant is convicted of first-degree murder both on the basis of felony murder and of premeditation and deliberation, see, for example, State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 341 , 561 S.E.2d 245, 258 , cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006 , 154 L. Ed. 2d 404 (2002), defendant here did not request that the prosecution commit itself to establishing any of the offenses listed in this circumstance. Instead he only asked, in effect, whether the prosecution would seek to submit this aggravating circumstance to the jury at sentencing.
Thus, defendant did not request that the prosecution state which underlying felony or felonies it would attempt to prove to establish felony murder. In addition, even if he had, the controlling statute states that “[a] motion for a bill of particulars must request and specify items of factual information.” N.C.G.S. § 15A-925(b) (2003). Defendant’s motion did not request specific factual information on which the prosecution would rely to support any underlying felony that the prosecution might seek to establish as a basis for felony murder. Because defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars did not meet the statutory requirements, I do not believe that the trial judge’s denial of the motion was a “ ‘palpable and gross abuse’ ” of discretion. State v. Easterling, 300 N.C. 594, 601 , 268 S.E.2d 800, 805 (1980) (quoting State v. McLaughlin, 286 N.C. 597, 603 , 213 S.E.2d 238, 242 (1975), death sentence vacated, 428 U.S. 903 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (1976)).