concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothet- ical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “merely exercised his right to answer some questions and not to answer others”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that the defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when he said, “I have nothing to say” in response to a hypothet- ical description of how he might have killed his wife, and the defendant instead “merely exercised his right to answer some questions and not to answer others”
- holding that a defendant had not invoked his right to remain silent when, in response to a particular question, he said, “I have nothing to say”; noting, instead, that the defendant “merely exercised his right to answer some questions and not to answer others”
- stating that, for the exclusionary rule to apply to the actions of an informant, the state must be “involved to a sufficient extent in initiating, planning, controlling or supporting the informant’s activities” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
- holding that compelling circumstances did not exist where source of the defendant’s inability to leave treatment facility was not police conduct but, rather, because leaving might violate the defendant’s probation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FADELEY, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent for the reasons stated in the dissenting opinions in State v. Moen, 309 Or 45 , 786 P2d 111 (1990) and State v. Wagner (II), 309 Or 5 , 786 P2d 93 (1990). I believe the court should assess and fix final punishment now under the statute rather than sending this case back to the trial court for a further penalty phase trial which will lead to further delay and may lead to further appeals costly to the public.