explaining that police act as "gratuitous depositors" when in possession of impounded car and state law requires "slight care for the preservation of the thing deposited"
How later courts described this case
- explaining that police act as "gratuitous depositors" when in possession of impounded car and state law requires "slight care for the preservation of the thing deposited"
- cannot open closed, but unlocked, glove compartment
- judgment reinstated on state grounds
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WOLLMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
Because the intrusion by the police into defendant’s automobile, even if it is characterized as a search, was clearly reasonable *38 under the rationale of Cady v. Dombrowski, 1973, 413 U.S. 433 , 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528 , 37 L.Ed.2d 706 , I would hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence.
Defendant’s automobile was first ticketed at 3 a. m., when an officer observed it parked on a street a short distance from a sign that informed the public that parking was prohibited from 2 a. m. to 6 a. m. Apparently the vehicle remained in place until approximately 10 a. m. the same day, when another police officer issued a ticket for overtime parking. In accordance with standard police procedures, the vehicle was then towed to the impoundment lot, where, again according to established routine procedures, an officer made an inspection of the exterior condition of the automobile and an inventory of the contents of the interior of the automobile. The glove compartment was unlocked. There was no entry by the police into the locked trunk compartment.
The officer who conducted the inspection and inventory testified that all vehicles taken to the impoundment lot are inventoried against a standard inventory sheet. This is done because in past instances property has been stolen from locked cars in the impoundment lot. The officer testified that he had never seen defendant’s vehicle before, that he did not know defendant, and that he had no reason to suspect that the automobile might contain drugs.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the police acted illegally, unreasonably or improperly in towing defendañt’s automobile from where it was illegally parked to the impoundment lot. The officers apparently treated defendant’s automobile as they would have treated any other automobile found in the same circumstances. The record reveals that the Vermillion police department tows away vehicles for violation of ordinances designating restricted parking zones. The fair inference from the testimony of the officers is that vehicles thus illegally parked in the downtown area of Vermillion are considered to present more of a problem to city officials than those that are parked merely in violation of parking meter restrictions. The following language from Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, is applicable here:
*39 * * * The Thunderbird was not parked adjacent to the dwelling place of the owner as in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), nor simply momentarily unoccupied on a street. Rather, like an obviously abandoned vehicle, it represented a nuisance, and there is no suggestion in the record that the officers’ action in exercising control over it by having it towed away was unwarranted either in terms of state law or sound police procedure.”
The case of United States v. Lawson, 8 Cir., 487 F.2d 468 , is distinguishable. In that case, defendant was present at the time his vehicle was seized by the police. There was nothing in the record to indicate that it was necessary for the police to impound the vehicle. (The Government expressly disavowed any contention that the search was incidental to a lawful arrest. 487 F.2d at 469 ). Entry was made into the locked trunk compartment of the vehicle.
I would not restrict the police to an inventory of only those items that are in plain view within the interior of an automobile. Whether an inspection of the interior of a locked glove compartment would be reasonable or unreasonable would depend upon the circumstances under which such entry was made. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra. What was said in United States v. Gravitt, 5 Cir., 484 F.2d 375 , is applicable here:
“ * * * But we are confident that here, as in other contexts, reviewing courts will be' fully capable of assuring that the scope of the intrusions involved will be tailored to the specific public interests which lie at the root of the finding that the intrusions are reasonable.” (Citations omitted) 484 F.2d at 380 .
I would affirm the judgment.