“The use of a writing to refresh present recollection does not make it admissible in evidence. The witness’s independent recollection is the evidence — not the writing which aided in refreshing that recollection.” (Citations omitted.)
How later courts described this case
- “The use of a writing to refresh present recollection does not make it admissible in evidence. The witness’s independent recollection is the evidence — not the writing which aided in refreshing that recollection.” (Citations omitted.)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BRYSON, J.,
dissenting.
The evidence received in this case falls within the rule proposed by the dissent of Chief Justice O’Connell in State v. Derryberry, 270 Or 482, 492 , 528 P2d 1034 (1974), and would have been admissible under that dissent. I joined in the dissent in State v. Derryberry, *107 supra. Also, in my concurring opinion in Rhodes v. Harwood, 273 Or 903 , 544 P2d 147 (1975), I again asserted that it was my opinion that this court should adopt Rule 63(1) of the Proposed Uniform Rules of Evidence.
In this case, the defendant’s statements, included in the writing which was received in evidence, were also testified to by him at trial. It would seem to me that the admission of the writing would be merely cumulative and, therefore, not prejudicial error. Under these circumstances, I do not feel that we can "presume” that the receiving of the defendant’s statement in evidence was prejudicial error. For these reasons, I would affirm the trial court.