stating, "[the petitioner cannot recover for the alleged tortious interference with a contract because the agreement was nonexclusive in nature and had not been breached," and omitting discussion of other means of proving intentional interference claim
How later courts described this case
- stating, "[the petitioner cannot recover for the alleged tortious interference with a contract because the agreement was nonexclusive in nature and had not been breached," and omitting discussion of other means of proving intentional interference claim
- “The mere fact that there is a difference of opinion between the parties does not of itself create an ambiguity.”
- once a contract is determined to contain ambiguity and the ambiguity cannot be resolved by reference to other provisions in the contract, the court must admit extrinsic evidence in order to determine the mutual intent of the parties at the time of contracting, and such intent is an issue of fact to be determined in the same manner as other disputed factual issues
- “In ascertaining whether certain provisions of a document are ambiguous, the instrument’s language must be examined and construed in harmony with the plain and generally accepted meaning of the words employed, and reference must be made to all the provisions of the agreement.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MR. JUSTICE CARRIGAN
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The contract at issue here contains conflicting clauses which in my view cannot be reconciled without considering parole evidence. After providing that the petitioner is to “furnish to the Hospital all radiology services which it may require during that term of this Agreement,” the contract goes on to state that such services are to include “radiology services to the in or out-patients of the Hospital’s Medical Staff upon request by any member of the Medical Staff.” (Emphasis added.) It is impossible to determine, solely from the contract language, whether the parties *259 intended the contract to be exclusive or subject to each staff doctor’s discretionary choice of radiologists. If, as the majority opinion recognizes, a physician’s right to select professional consultants for his patients may be limited by an exclusive service contract, either construction would be reasonable.
Given this ambiguity in the contract’s language, the trial court properly received extrinsic evidence for the purpose of determining the parties’ intent. Ryan v. Fitzpatrick Drilling Co., Inc., 139 Colo. 471 , 342 P.2d 1040 (1959). Determination of that intent in light of the evidence then became a question of fact for the jury. Metropolitan Paving Co. v. City of Aurora, 449 F.2d 177 (10th Cir. 1971); Halsey v. Darling, 13 Colo. 1 , 21 P. 913 (1889). See also Cosper v. Hancock, 163 Colo. 263 , 430 P.2d 80 (1967). The record clearly reflects that ample evidence was presented to support the jury’s conclusion that an exclusive contract was in fact intended. Therefore, I would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the jury’s verdict.
MR. JUSTICE KELLEY authorizes me to state that he joins in this dissent.