holding that an insurance company could assert its insured’s attorney-client privilege in a third-party bad-faith claim and discussing the inapplicability of the quasi attorney-client privilege to the facts of the case
How later courts described this case
- holding that an insurance company could assert its insured’s attorney-client privilege in a third-party bad-faith claim and discussing the inapplicability of the quasi attorney-client privilege to the facts of the case
- discussing footnotes and concluding, among other things, that “language in a footnote generally should be considered obiter dicta which, by definition, is language ‘unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not precedential.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (7th ed. 1999).”
- stating that "[t]his Court concurs with the reasoning of the Montana court" in rejecting discoverability of insurance company's files in bad-faith actions
- stating that "[tjhis Court concurs with the reasoning of the Montana court” in rejecting discoverability of insurance company’s files in bad-faith actions
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McGRAW, J.,
dissenting.
(Filed July 2, 2003)
I dissent from the majority opinion in this case because I believe the time-honored sanctity of the attorney-client privilege should not be shamelessly invoked to shield an insurer’s tortious conduct, the aim of which is to defeat an injured party’s legitimate claim. Though the majority states otherwise, there is simply no substitute for the discovery of material generated contemporaneously with the handling of a claim and for the sole purpose of denying a claim. Justice Davis, who has authored a concurring opinion in this case, elaborates extensively in this regard and, in my view, makes an excellent argument for denying the Respondent insurer’s petition for writ of prohibition. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in Justice Davis’ concurring opinion, I respectfully dissent.