explaining that under North Carolina law the “intent and meaning of an alleged defamatory statement must be gathered not only from words singled out as libelous, but from the context in which they appear.”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that under North Carolina law the “intent and meaning of an alleged defamatory statement must be gathered not only from words singled out as libelous, but from the context in which they appear.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Judge Wells
dissenting.
When viewed from its four corners, the publication complained of constitutes an expression of opinion regarding activities and comments of a public figure that, in my opinion, is entitled to protection under the Article I, Sec. 14 of the Constitu *244 tion of North Carolina and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I believe this case to be a fair example of where the public’s interest in uninhibited, robust, and open comment is paramount to an individual’s interest in protecting his reputation or privacy. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed. 2d 686 (1964); compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed. 2d 789 (1974); and Brown v. Boney, 41 N.C. App. 636 , 255 S.E. 2d 784 , disc. rev. denied, 298 N.C. 294 , 259 S.E. 2d 910 (1979).
For these reasons, I must respectfully dissent.