stating that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress "requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and which is of a nature especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind"
How later courts described this case
- stating that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress "requires conduct exceeding all bounds usually tolerated by decent society and which is of a nature especially calculated to cause, and does cause, mental distress of a very serious kind"
- stating that when the record indicates that matters outside of the pleadings were considered by the trial court, motions to dismiss are reviewed and disposed of as motions for summary judgment
- providing that when the record indicates that matters outside of the pleadings were considered by the court, motions to dismiss are reviewed and disposed of as motions for summary judgment
- noting that the court “sets out a five-part test for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy” and “then ignores portions of this test.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
Summary judgment was improper because a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Defendants’ conduct and comments precipitating Tibke’s loss of membership in both WRAC and ApHC. The burden is upon the Defendants, as moving party, to clearly show that when the evi *910 dence is viewed most favorably to Tibke, no genuine issue of material fact exists. Weiszhaar Farms v. Live Stock State Bank, 467 N.W.2d 752, 754 (S.D.1991); Klatt v. Continental Ins. Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 368 (S.D.1987). They failed to sustain their burden. State, Dept. of Revenue v. Thiewes, 448 N.W.2d 1, 3 (S.D.1989).
The majority opinion sets out the five-part test for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy. It then ignores portions of this test. Even if Tibke made no showing of any contract or business relationship, the record is replete with expectancies. (See, e.g., Affidavit of Elaine Thomas, SR 794, wherein she stated: “[W]e have therefore not been able to continue our practice of hiring Doris Tibke to show our horse. As far as we are concerned, the WRAC board is solely responsible for the inability for us to continue what had been a wonderful and continuous working relationship.”). Additionally, Tibke provided evidence that the value of her own horses, also a business expectancy, dropped due to her inability to show them. (See Affidavit of Roy Yates, SR 786).
Viewing the evidence most favorably to Tibke, genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether Defendants intentionally interfered with Tibke’s business expectancies by causing her loss of WRAC and ApHC membership. Therefore, summary judgment was improper. Groseth Intern., Inc. v. Tenneco, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 159, 172 (S.D.1987). I would reverse and remand for a trial.