finding admissible as present sense impression victim’s mother’s testimony that victim came to mother’s house crying and stated that defendant had kicked her out of house, even though statement was made after victim drove from defendant’s house in Willow Springs to her mother’s house in Raleigh
How later courts described this case
- finding admissible as present sense impression victim’s mother’s testimony that victim came to mother’s house crying and stated that defendant had kicked her out of house, even though statement was made after victim drove from defendant’s house in Willow Springs to her mother’s house in Raleigh
- holding that trial court did not err in failing to excuse juror for cause where juror stated that he could put aside his preconceived notions as to defendant’s guilt or innocence
- holding that, although the offenses were not joined for trial, the trial court properly admitted evidence of one murder at the trial of the other under Rule 404(b)
- ordering a new sentencing proceeding when the trial court ignored defendant’s request and failed to submit nonstatutory mitigators in writing to jury
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice WEBB
dissenting.
I dissent from that part of the majority opinion which holds that the testimony of Celia Mansary was admissible. Ms. Mansary was allowed to testify that Karen Puryear had told her that defendant had beaten her on several occasions and threatened to kill her if she tried to ■ take the children from him.
The majority reasons that this testimony of Ms. Mansary was admissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3) which provides that a statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind may be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. The majority says these statements “related directly to Karen’s existing state of mind and emotional condition.”
It is true that if these things had happened to Karen Puryear she would probably have been emotional and upset about them. If this makes the testimony admissible it seems to me we have opened the door to any hearsay testimony the subject of which can be shown to have been upsetting to the declarant. This is a wide door indeed. I would limit this exception to testimony as to statements of the declarant which say what is his or her mental or emotional state. I believe this is all that was intended by the Legislature.