Opinion

Bulala v. Boyd

  • 239 Va. 218
  • 6 Va. Law Rep. 1399
  • 389 S.E.2d 670
  • 1990 Va. LEXIS 44
Court
Supreme Court of Virginia
Filed
Mar 2, 1990
Status
Published
Author
Whiting
On the bench
Carrico, Compton, Stephenson, Russell, Whiting, Lacy, Poff
Cited by
79 cases
Authority
More cited than 6.0%

stating that "the father, of course, was not the [obstetrician's] `patient,' within the meaning of the Act"

How later courts described this case

  • stating that "the father, of course, was not the [obstetrician's] `patient,' within the meaning of the Act"
  • holding that punitive damages were extinguished when compensatory damages exceeded the total amount recoverable under Va. Code § 8.01-581.15
  • holding that punitive damages could not be awarded where compensatory damages already exceeded the statutory cap
  • involving a medical malpractice claim involving the negligent delivery of a child, stating that Naccash was to be “confined to its particular facts”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

JUSTICE WHITING,

dissenting in part.

I dissent only from that portion of Part VI of the opinion which allocates the remainder of the compensatory damages attributable to the child’s injuries, solely to the child’s claim. Consistent with the approach of other jurisdictions, I would prorate these limited compensatory damages, derived from the child’s injuries, among: (1) her individual claim; (2) her parents’ derivative claim for medical expenses; and (3) her father’s derivative claim for emotional distress. This allocation should be based on the claims’ relative shares of the jury’s original compensatory damage awards related to the child’s injuries.

Where several claims arising from one accident are joined in one suit against the insurer whose maximum liability under the policy is inadequate to pay in full the amounts to which the claimants become entitled, it has generally been held that the proceeds are to be distributed on a pro rata basis in accordance with the amount of damage suffered by each claimant.

*238 15A G. Couch, Insurance § 56:35 (2d ed. 1983). This is true regardless of whether some of the claims are derivative in nature. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 19 A.D.2d 552, 552-53 , 240 N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (1963); Landrum v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 149 So. 2d 182, 188 (La. Ct. App. 1963).

The jury’s compensatory damage award related to the child’s injuries, totalled $4,725,00o, 1 of which $1,850,000 was allocable to the child individually. Therefore, the limited compensatory damages should be allocated among the several claims as follows:

Child’s Father’s Parents’ Total Claim 2 Claim 3 Claim 4

Malpractice Cap less: $750,000 293,651 186,508 269,841

Share of Previous Judgment (325,000) (127,249) (80,820) (116,931)

Allocable Remaining Compensatory Damages Related to the Child’s Injury $425,000 166,402 105,688 152,910

Child’s award................................................... $1,850,000

Father’s award.................................................. 1,175,000

Parents’ award.................................................. 1,700,000

Compensatory damages relating to child’s injury $4,725,000

The child’s share of the respective total amounts is based on her share of the jury’s total award of compensatory damages related to her injuries ($1,850,000/4,725,000).

The father’s share of these totals is based on his relative share of the jury award of compensatory damages relating to the child’s injuries ($1,175,000/4,725,000).

The parents’ share of these totals is based on their relative share of the jury award of compensatory damages relating to the child’s injuries ($1,700,000/4,725,OOO).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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