psychiatric social worker permitted to testify to defendant’s sanity where rules permit lay opinion on insanity and expert had clinical background and close contact with defendant
How later courts described this case
- psychiatric social worker permitted to testify to defendant’s sanity where rules permit lay opinion on insanity and expert had clinical background and close contact with defendant
- whether to admit relevant testimony of mental health experts
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Sommerville, 111 Wash. 2d 524 (1988)
89 Wn.2d 256, 264 , 571 P.2d 930 (1977) overruled on other grounds by State v. Sommerville, 111 Wn.2d 524, 530-31 , 760 P.2d 932
The opinion
Utter, J.
(concurring)—I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I cannot subscribe to the treatment afforded the admission of the defendant's confession. As I understand the majority opinion, it upholds the admission of the challenged confession on two grounds. The opinion asserts the admission of the confession was not prejudicial because the facts pertinent to the commission of the crimes charged were conceded to be true at the time of trial and the confession was utilized by the defense in attempting to establish the defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity. This discussion is dispositive of the issue raised and I *275 am in agreement with it. The majority also contends, however, that the confession was admissible on the basis the defendant "knew he had the right to remain silent." In so holding the majority improperly states the recognized constitutional test for the validity of confessions. The test established by the United States Supreme Court and acknowledged by this court requires not only that the defendant be informed of and understand his right to remain silent, but also that the decision to waive the right to silence be intelligently made. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S. Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 12 L. Ed. 2d 977 , 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964); State v. Aiken, 72 Wn.2d 306 , 434 P.2d 10 (1967) (vacated and remanded on other grounds, Wheat v. Washington, 392 U.S. 652 , 20 L. Ed. 2d 1357 , 88 S. Ct. 2302 (1968)).
The record indicates that at the time of giving the challenged confession, the defendant felt he had been functioning as an agent of the State in committing the crimes charged and would never be brought to trial. He also felt the interrogating officers to be his allies and was suspicious of the motives of his counsel. It is difficult to comprehend how one who was in fact operating under such a delusion could intelligently elect to confess his crimes. The majority's suggestion that knowledge of the right to remain silent, standing alone, establishes an adequate foundation for a valid confession is inconsistent with established constitutional principles and unnecessary to the resolution of the issue raised.
Stafford, J., concurs with Utter, J.
Petition for rehearing denied March 29, 1978.