Opinion

Youst v. Longo

  • 43 Cal. 3d 64
  • 233 Cal. Rptr. 294
  • 729 P.2d 728
  • 85 A.L.R. 4th 1025
  • 1987 Cal. LEXIS 274
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Jan 2, 1987
Status
Published
Author
Reynoso
On the bench
Lucas, Reynoso, Grodin
Cited by
122 cases

stating that plaintiff could not recover value of lost prize discounted by probability of winning in absence of interference because outcome of the race was too speculative

How later courts described this case

  • stating that plaintiff could not recover value of lost prize discounted by probability of winning in absence of interference because outcome of the race was too speculative
  • “It is a well-settled general tort principle that interference with the chance of winning a contest, such as the horserace at issue here, usually presents a situation too uncertain upon which to base tort liability. ”
  • "the conspirators must 20 agree to do some act which is classified as a 'civil wrong'"]. 21 Liability for civil conspiracy under California law requires that 22 three elements be satisfied: (1) formation of the conspiracy 23 (i.e., that there be an agreement to commit wrongful acts
  • interference with prospective economic advantage

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

REYNOSO, J.

I concur, but on a limited basis. The majority correctly hold that tort liability for potential economic loss as a result of illegal conduct which occurs during a sporting event is prohibited on the basis of public policy. No more need be said.

We deal with a very narrow factual situation, a sporting event. Many older cases, mentioned in the majority, dealing with the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage turn almost entirely upon the defendant’s motive or purpose, and the means by which it will be accomplished. Such an approach was used primarily to emphasize that the tort was not applicable in the context of bona fide competition. (4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (4th ed. 1974) § 392, p. 2643.) In sporting events, where the line between bona fide competition and unfair competition is so finely drawn as to require regulation by specific agencies or organizations, the courts should not interfere.

The emphasis on improper conduct which we find in those older cases does not lessen or diminish plaintiff’s burden to establish, as a threshold *84 requirement, probable economic gain. The lack of any reasonable probability that gain would have been realized defeats the cause. Thus, it is not enough to conclude, as did the Court of Appeal, that the acts of two or more persons to achieve illegal goals comprise the type of improper conduct that is actionable.

Defendant’s other contentions need not be reached: (1) that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to consider plaintiff’s claim, or (2) whether the California Horse Racing Board has the exclusive power to consider claims for compensatory relief. The Court of Appeal found it necessary to reach the latter issue because it concluded that a cause of action had been stated. However, plaintiff never sought compensatory relief from the board; and since we have decided that no cause of action has been stated, there is no reason for this court to reach that question.

Bird, C. J., concurred.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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