noting that the distinction between negligence and strict liability in design defect cases must “matter to an extent”
How later courts described this case
- noting that the distinction between negligence and strict liability in design defect cases must “matter to an extent”
- listing factors relevant to a risk- utility analysis, which include "the user's knowledge of the product. . . as well as common knowledge and the expectation of danger"
- providing examples of risk-utility factors the trier of fact may consider in design-defect cases, which include “the user’s ability to avoid danger” and “the collateral safety of a feature other than the one that harmed the plaintiff”
- listing non-exhaustive list of factors, including usefulness of product, gravity and severity of danger posed by design, likelihood of that danger, avoidability of danger
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Carley, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I fully concur in Divisions 1 and 3 of the majority opinion, but cannot concur in Division 2. I agree with adoption of the risk-utility analysis for design defect claims and with the disapproval of the analysis in Mann v. Coast Catamaran Corp., 254 Ga. 201 ( 326 SE2d 436 ) (1985). However, the Court of Appeals correctly applied the law as it existed at the time of its decision. Now that the rule has been changed on certiorari, I would remand this case to the Court of Appeals to allow it to apply the new rule to the record and to enable the parties properly to address the record in light of the new rule. At such time, the Court of Appeals would also need to consider ICI’s remaining enumerations of error, which it did not address in its original opinion. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.