describing procedure by which defendant may obtain pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the State's factual allegations to establish a prima facie case of guilt
How later courts described this case
- describing procedure by which defendant may obtain pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the State's factual allegations to establish a prima facie case of guilt
- trial court may dismiss criminal charge before trial if, upon viewing the State’s evidence, it determines that no reasonable trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
- trial court may dismiss prosecution prior to trial for insufficient evidence if the factual allegations and evidence offered by the State, taken in the light most favorable to the State, do not allow a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
- “A dismissal and discharge under this procedure is not a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense based on additional evidence.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Durham, J.
(dissenting)—The majority opinion directly conflicts with our previous case law and circumvents this court's traditional rulemaking process. Therefore, I dissent.
This court has twice held that a trial court does not have the inherent power to dismiss criminal charges before trial *358 based on insufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. State v. Morton, 83 Wn.2d 863 , 523 P.2d 199 (1974); State v. Tyler, 77 Wn.2d 726 , 466 P.2d 120 (1970), modified on other grounds in 408 U.S. 937 (1972). The majority attempts to distinguish Morton and Tyler on the ground that they both involved factual disputes which a jury would have to resolve. The majority's position is that a pretrial motion to dismiss can be granted if it raises only legal issues. However, a close examination of Tyler reveals that no such distinction between factual and legal issues exists. In Tyler, the defendant moved before trial to dismiss the charge against him. He argued that the evidence was insufficient for a jury to convict him. Although this court characterized the motion as raising only legal issues, we held that the motion was untimely, noting that: "The court could not test the sufficiency of the evidence until it had heard it. Consequently, defendant's claim made before trial . . . was premature and properly denied." Tyler, at 738. Thus, the majority's distinction is illusory. As I read Tyler, pretrial motions to dismiss a criminal charge based on an insufficiency of the evidence must be denied, even if only issues of law are raised. The majority's opinion cannot be justified absent an explicit overruling of Tyler.
Equally troubling is the manner in which the majority establishes an entirely new procedure for criminal trials. Such sweeping changes are better adopted through this court's rulemaking procedures than by opinion. GR 9; RCW 2.04.190. Rulemaking is appropriate because all interested and affected parties are given the opportunity to be heard on the proposal. Certainly in the case of a proposed procedure for the pretrial dismissal of criminal actions, this court would want to receive comments from prosecutors, defense counsel, the Superior Court Judges Association, and others on the possible consequences of the new rule. GR 9(e). The purposes of the rulemaking process are worth noting here:
In promulgating rules of court it is the purpose of the Washington State Supreme Court to ensure that:
(1) An orderly and uniform procedure is followed;
*359 (2) All interested groups are given notice and an opportunity to express views regarding proposed rules-,
(3) Adequate notice of adopted rules changes and of the effective dates is given;
(4) All proposed rules are necessary statewide;
(5) Rules changes are minimized to prevent disruption of court practice;
(6) The purpose of rules of court is to provide necessary governance of court procedure and practice; and
(7) All rules of court are clear and definite in application.
(Italics mine.) GR 9(a).
Upon receiving comments on such a proposed rule, we would then be in the best position to adopt, reject, or modify it. To adopt a rule with sweeping implications for criminal procedure by opinion, thus circumventing the rule-making procedure, is precipitous.
Dolliver, C.J., and Andersen and Callow, JJ., concur with Durham, J.