holding that state licensing requirement impeding state resident from practicing particular profession within the state does not implicate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which in general “bar[s] . . . claims against ‘the power of the State governments over the rights of [their] own citizens’” (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77 )
How later courts described this case
- holding that state licensing requirement impeding state resident from practicing particular profession within the state does not implicate the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which in general “bar[s] . . . claims against ‘the power of the State governments over the rights of [their] own citizens’” (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 77 )
- holding a licensing regulation that discriminated between pest-controllers based upon the type of pest controlled failed "the relatively easy standard of rational basis review" because it "was designed to favor economically certain constituents at the expense of others similarly situated"
- holding that a California statute excluding certain workers from an exemption from licensing requirements violated the Equal Protection Clause because the exclusion was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest
- finding that exemptions for nonpesticide pest controllers of certain vertebrates, but not others, violated equal protection even though broad licensing scheme was otherwise constitutional
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS,
Circuit
Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I certainly agree with the majority’s carefully thought out determination that California is entitled to require testing for pesticide knowledge of rodent and pest control operators who employ non-pesticide methods. Like the district court, however, I think it rationally follows from this that the state may determine which type of service providers should face a testing or licensing requirement and which should not. See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976) (legislatures may adopt regulations that “only partially ameliorate a perceived evil”). I would affirm across the board.