holding the defendant was not prejudiced by the charge that included the language “time is not a material element of sexual assault involving a child” and allowing the jury to consider a larger time period than that introduced into evidence by the State because the defendant “produced alibi evidence for every weekend during the entire time period charged”
How later courts described this case
- holding the defendant was not prejudiced by the charge that included the language “time is not a material element of sexual assault involving a child” and allowing the jury to consider a larger time period than that introduced into evidence by the State because the defendant “produced alibi evidence for every weekend during the entire time period charged”
- stating the expert was qualified to testify about rape trauma syndrome when she held a master's degree in social work, attended training seminars regarding the subject matter, and had been involved in more than one hundred cases involving sexually abused children
- holding even if the defendant had successfully renewed his objection to the witness's testimony after his motion in limine, any error would have been harmless because two other witnesses testified to the same fact without objection
- finding where a counselor’s testimony exceeded the time and place limitation by stating the defendant’s name during testimony, any error was harmless because two other witnesses testified without objection in the same manner
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493 (2016)
312 S.C. 502, 505 , 435 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1993) ("The qualification of a witness as an expert falls largely within the trial [court's] discretion."), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stukes, 416 S.C. 493 , 787 S.E.2d 480
The opinion
Finney, Justice
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. I would hold that expert testimony relating to sexual abuse trauma evidence is relevant and admissible only where it is offered to rebut a defense claim that the victim’s actions were inconsistent with such trauma. State v. Hudnall, 293 S.C. 97 , 359 S.E. (2d) 59 (1987). Here, appellant did not contest the victim’s assertion that she had suffered a sexual assault but offered an alibi defense. Accordingly, since the rape trauma evidence was not relevant to the *510 sole issue at trial — identity—its admission constituted reversible error. State v. Hudnall, supra.
Further, contrary to the view of the majority, I do not perceive an irreconcilable conflict between our decision in Hudnall and in State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377 , 401 S.E. (2d) 146 (1991). In Alexander , we held that where the only issue was consent, an alleged rape victim’s testimony of her own emotional trauma was relevant. We found, however, that in that case the evidence was unduly prejudicial under its unique facts. This case, like Hudnall and unlike Alexander , involves the admissibility of expert testimony where it is not relevant to any defense. Since the testimony is not relevant and therefore not admissible, we need not weigh its prejudicial value against its probative effect. I would reverse on the basis of Hudnall .
I would also hold that the “no corroboration” charge based on S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-657 (1985) was reversible error. It is axiomatic that a trial judge must not indicate an opinion or express a view reasonably calculated to influence the jury in deciding a material issue of fact because such comment is forbidden by S.C. Const, art. V, § 21. State v. Simmons, 209 S.C. 531 , 41 S.E. (2d) 217 (1947). Since the charge specified only that the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated, it appears to express an opinion on her credibility. In State v. Bagwell, 201 S.C. 387 , 23 S.E. (2d) 244 (1943), this Court rejected a similar “no corroboration charge” in the context of accomplice testimony. The law found in Section 16-3-657 should not be charged to the jury. S.C. Const, art. V, § 21.
The majority does not discuss the propriety of the “no corroboration” charge itself, but instead holds that the jury charge as a whole did not constitute reversible error. I disagree. We have rejected such analysis in State v. Bagwell, supra. Further, the charge was especially prejudicial in this case because it was the victim’s word against the defendant’s. I would hold that the giving of this charge was reversible error. Accord, Cox v. State, 44 S.W. 157 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1898).