concluding that “for some types of error, such as the erroneous admission . . . of evidence, overwhelming evidence of guilt will ordinarily lead to the conclusion that the error was harmless”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that “for some types of error, such as the erroneous admission . . . of evidence, overwhelming evidence of guilt will ordinarily lead to the conclusion that the error was harmless”
- discussed approvingly in Lukity, and explaining, inter alia, that “courts analyzing preserved error in terms of their view regarding whether the defendant is guilty have been wrong,” as “[t]he defendant’s right to a fair trial by jury requires that preserved error be reviewed in terms of its effect on the factfinder”
- stating that reversal is only required if the error was prejudicial
- “The defendant’s right to a fair trial by jury requires that preserved error be reviewed in terms of its effect on the factfinder.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Weaver, J.
(concurring). I have signed Justice Boyle’s opinion because I believe that it is essential for this Court to establish a clear, workable standard of review for preserved, nonconstitutional error.
I write separately to state my position that MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 has established a presumption that this error is harmless. MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096 provides that a judgment shall not be overturned “unless in the opinion of the court, after an examination of the entire cause, it shall affirmatively appear *222 that the error complained of has residted in a miscarriage of justice.” Thus, I would place the burden of showing why the judgment should be overturned on the defendant. This approach is consistent with the rule that after conviction a defendant is no longer presumed innocent. People v Fritch, 161 Mich 111, 115 ; 125 NW 785 (1910).
This allocation of the burden of proof has been recognized by our Courts in the past:
After a man has been convicted, the presumption of innocence, of which so much is made in our practice, attends him no longer. He has been convicted by a jury, and he has the burden of convincing . . . that the record upon which he stands convicted is open to serious question .... [Id. at 115:]
After lawful conviction a defendant is no longer presumed innocent. He then has the burden of satisfying the reviewing court that the record upon which he was convicted discloses reversible error. [People v Rowell, 14 Mich App 190, 196 ; 165 NW2d 423 (1968).]
When a defendant has pleaded guilty and appeals arguing that “the facts elicited from defendant at the arraignment [do not] support a finding of guilty, . . . defendant has the burden of showing a miscarriage of justice.” People v Davis, 24 Mich App 304, 305 ; 180 NW2d 285 (1970).