holding that a household exclusion limiting liability coverage to statutory minimum for injuries to family members of insured residing in insured’s household was unenforceable against insured husband and injured wife under doctrine of reasonable expectations
How later courts described this case
- holding that a household exclusion limiting liability coverage to statutory minimum for injuries to family members of insured residing in insured’s household was unenforceable against insured husband and injured wife under doctrine of reasonable expectations
- applying the reasonable expectations test and finding a household exclusion contained in a State Farm Policy unenforceable
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROOKS, Judge,
dissenting,
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions as to what a reasonably intelligent insured would believe when presented with the insurance policy at issue in this case. At the very least, a factual issue is presented which precludes summary judgment in favor of the insured.
The majority concedes that the family or household exclusion clause at issue does not violate public policy, and that it is neither unusual nor unconscionable. The majority concludes, however, that the exclusion is unenforceable “because of its technical wording and inconspicuous location within the policy boilerplate, and because it guts the coverage ostensibly granted by the declarations page.”
First, by their very nature, all policy exclusions have an eviscerating effect on the face amount of coverage. Were it otherwise, they would not be “exclusions.” Considering the policy in the instant case as a whole, however, I find it to be clear and unambiguous as to the extent of coverage.
Further, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, there is nothing “inconspicuous” about the location of the policy provision in question. To the contrary, it is quite prominently displayed in the liability section of the policy that begins by advising the reader that “THERE IS NO COVERAGE....” *463 (Emphasis in original.) This section immediately follows the description of what is covered — certainly not an unreasonable sequence.
The majority does not tell us where the exclusion at issue should have been placed, except by inferring that the declarations page would have been an appropriate location. Carrying the majority’s analysis to its natural conclusion, however, it could be argued that all limits of liability are unenforceable if they deviate from the summary of coverage on the declarations page — a patently unreasonable position. Moreover, at least in the case at hand, such an argument would ignore the following notation which prominently appears on the declarations page:
YOUR POLICY CONSISTS OF THIS PAGE, ANY ENDORSEMENTS, AND THE POLICY BOOKLET, FORM 9803.4. PLEASE KEEP TOGETHER.
(Emphasis in original.) Further, the declarations page also lists the general types of coverage, e.g., “liability,” and then notes that they are “AS DEFINED IN POLICY.” (Emphasis in original.)
In conclusion, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court. At the very minimum, however, the matter should be remanded for a trial on the merits rather than directing entry of summary judgment in favor of the insured. Otherwise, it appears that the majority has taken a rather bold step by concluding that issues of “reasonable expectations” in contracts of insurance are questions of law to be resolved in all instances by the court.