holding that to maintain an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish "(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage" (quoting Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321 , 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965))
How later courts described this case
- holding that to maintain an action for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must establish "(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings; (2) by or at the instance of the defendant; (3) termination of such proceedings in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in instituting such proceedings; (5) lack of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage" (quoting Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321 , 143 S.E.2d 607, 608 (1965))
- stating that while futility is a general exception to the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, it must be demonstrated by a showing comparable to the administrative agency taking "a hard and fast position that makes an adverse ruling a certainty." (quoting Thetford Props. IV Ltd. P'ship v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 907 F.2d 445 , 450 (4th Cir. 1990))
- stating that whether to require the plaintiff to exhaust administrative remedies is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion (citing Andrews Bearing Corp., 261 S.C. at 536 , 201 S.E.2d at 243 ; Tri-County Ice & Fuel Co. v. Palmetto Ice Co., 303 S.C. 237, 242 , 399 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1990))
- explaining that an appellate court will reverse the circuit court’s ruling on a directed verdict motion only “when there is no evidence to support the ruling or where the ruling is controlled by an error of law.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice PLEICONES
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority opinion that the grant of summary judgment on the malicious-prosecution claims and the directed verdict on the wrongful-termination claims should be affirmed. I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of JNOV on the false-imprisonment claims, because the evidence in the record yields at least one inference that supports the jury’s verdict. See Strange v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways and Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429-30 , 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994) (providing the standard for ruling on motions for JNOV).
The lawful-authority determination here turns on whether the insufficient warrant affidavits were sufficiently supplemented by sworn oral testimony pursuant to State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336, 338 , 372 S.E.2d 587, 588 (1988). If so, then the warrants were valid and lawful authority to arrest was present. If not, then the warrants were not issued pursuant to *444 legal process, and lawful authority to arrest was absent. The relevant evidence is the trial testimony of the magistrate and the trial testimony of Investigator Nettles. As stated in the majority opinion, “the magistrate, who issued the arrest warrants, testified he routinely conducted an oral report, under oath, in addition to the affidavits presented to him before making a probable cause determination. Nettles testified she and Baker gave sworn, oral testimony to the magistrate, which included examples of corroboration of Harrison’s allegations.” The majority holds that this trial testimony proves the warrant affidavits were orally supplemented. In so holding, the majority necessarily passes on the credibility of witness. I disagree with the holding because it was within the jury’s province to believe or disbelieve this trial testimony. See Curcio v. Caterpillar, Inc., 355 S.C. 316 , 585 S.E.2d 272 (2003) (holding that “[w]hen considering a JNOV, neither an appellate court, nor the trial court has authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the testimony or the evidence”) (internal quotation omitted). In my opinion, the evidence yields at least one reasonable inference that the warrant affidavits were not orally supplemented. That inference supports a conclusion that the warrants were not issued pursuant to legal process and that lawful authority was therefore absent. Consequently, I would reverse the grant of JNOV and reinstate the jury’s verdict on Appellants’ false-imprisonment claims.