finding sufficient evidence of possession based on the defendant’s sole occupancy of a rental car, admission that everything in the car belonged to him, contradictory statements concerning a package in the car that contained drugs, and ultimate admission that the package was given to him to deliver to an unknown person notwithstanding his further statement that he did not know what the package contained
How later courts described this case
- finding sufficient evidence of possession based on the defendant’s sole occupancy of a rental car, admission that everything in the car belonged to him, contradictory statements concerning a package in the car that contained drugs, and ultimate admission that the package was given to him to deliver to an unknown person notwithstanding his further statement that he did not know what the package contained
- holding argument on motion to suppress claiming evidence was insufficient to provide reasonable suspicion for stop did not preserve for appeal argument that initial stop immediately escalated into seizure for which probable cause was required
- holding that possession of an illegal substance in an amount exceeding that which is ordinarily possessed for personal use may sufficiently establish a defendant’s intent to distribute that substance
- affirming a conviction for intent to distribute cocaine where the defendant exhibited evasive driving when he spotted the police while traveling on I-95
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Keenan, J.,
concurring,
In my opinion, since there was no evidence before the trial court establishing the legal significance of the “drug courier profile,” the match between Iglesias’ individual circumstances and the profile characteristics did not provide an articulable basis for stopping Iglesias’ vehicle. That the officer attached a special meaning to these profile characteristics is not sufficient. Rather, the prosecution was required to prove the basis for attaching such a meaning to the observed facts, as well as the reasonableness of the conclusions drawn. United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1982). The Commonwealth failed to do this. I would affirm Iglesias’ conviction, however, finding that a legitimate traffic infraction had occurred and that the stop was not rendered pretextual simply because Berry’s subjective intent in stopping the vehicle was to investigate for narcotics.
In United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1982), the court articulated the following test for determining whether an investigative stop is pretextual: In determining whether an investigative stop is invalid as pretextual, the proper inquiry is whether a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of illegitimate motivation. Id. at 708 (emphasis in original). At the suppresion hearing in this case, defense counsel stipulated that, based on Iglesias’ driving conduct, Berry could have issued him a traffic summons. Berry also testified that a summons could have been issued for an improper lane change.
*112 In Smith , the court found that the stop involved was pretextual. There, however, the only evidence of aberrant driving behavior was that the defendent once deviated six inches out of his lane and was “weaving” slightly within his lane. In contrast, in the case before us, Trooper Berry testified that Iglesias changed lanes so abruptly that the tractor trailer behind him had to “slam” on its brakes. Upon this evidence, I conclude that the stop was objectively reasonable even in the absence of a subjective intent to cite Iglesias for a traffice infraction. See United States v. Klinger, 409 F.2d 299 , 304 (8th Cir. 1969). Therefore, since the stop of Iglesias was objectively reasonable, notwithstanding Berry’s subjective intent to investigate for narcotics, I would uphold it. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708 .
Iglesias does not contest the voluntariness of the consent to search that he gave Trooper Berry or claim that it was limited in scope. While the scope of the search conducted here exceeded the legitimate basis for the stop, I believe that Iglesias’ consent operated to validate the search of the automobile. A similar factual situation was presented to the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1972). In that case, the police had stopped an automobile for minor equipment violations: a burned-out headlight and license plate light. After the driver could not produce a license and only one of the other occupants produced identification, the officer asked if he could search the car. Upon being told, “Sure, go ahead,” the officer found some stolen checks under the left rear seat of the car.
In reaching its conclusion that the consent in question was voluntary, the Court reiterated the principle that a search authorized by consent is valid and meets fourth amendment requirements. Id. at 222 (citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 , 358 n.22 (1967)). The Court further noted that, as such, consent searches are a legitimate method of effective police work. Id. at 229.
Following the reasoning employed in Schneckloth , I believe that Trooper Berry was entitled to proceed with the search in question since he validly stopped Iglesias and received his voluntary consent to serach the vheicle. Based on the foregoing, I would conclude that the cocaine in question was lawfully seized. Further, I agree with the majority’s finding that the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Iglesias knowingly and intentionally possessed cocaine with the intent to distribute.