recognizing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff witnessed a vehicle nearly crash into her and immediately suffered emotional distress which resulted in physical symptoms
How later courts described this case
- recognizing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress where the plaintiff witnessed a vehicle nearly crash into her and immediately suffered emotional distress which resulted in physical symptoms
- holding that a party claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress cannot recover “for emotional disturbance alone”
- finding sufficient physical injury in the form of nervousness, insomnia, pains in the chest and arms, an inability to breastfeed, and an abnormal menstrual period
- recovery allowed for emotional disturbance and resulting physical injury, notwithstanding lack of physical impact, when proof is clear and convincing that physical injury was natural result of fright or shock proximately caused by defendant’s negligence
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Harrison, J.,
dissenting.
I would neither abrogate nor modify the impact rule as we have heretofore construed and applied it. The instant case demonstrates its wisdom.
Appellee was frightened and upset by the sight of an automobile accident. Three days later she consulted her family physician complaining of nervousness and other conditions. He apparently did not regard these conditions as so abnormal for three months had elapsed since the birth of her last baby. The doctor prescribed hormones and phenobarbital. He said: “I did not think too much at the time. We all have little incidents that upset us.” However, when she continued to be upset he recommended that she visit a psychiatrist.
The psychiatrist diagnosed her problem as “anxiety reaction”. The treatment prescribed was a sedative and psychotherapy. He translated the latter to mean “talking with her”. Appellee was in his office on five occasions. He said her prognosis “for continued activity and doing the things she should be doing is good unless of course she has some other thing that will stir her up again”. He also said “outside” of what appellee told him he would not have known she had an emotional problem, or what caused it.
*37 Applying the majority’s relaxed impact rule, I do not consider the evidence of the physicians sufficient to show that appellee’s diminishing breasts and the resumption of her menstrual period were the natural result of the fright or shock that she experienced on the night of the accident. The testimony established only emotional distress following a frightening experience. Appellee was not hospitalized, her medical bills totaled only $112, and her recovery was $12,000. I would reverse.