holding that a claim for breach of an implied warranty did not lie in a contract for personal services
How later courts described this case
- holding that a claim for breach of an implied warranty did not lie in a contract for personal services
- recognizing strict products liability but declining to impose strict liability upon those who have agreed to furnish labor or services
- “if the defective, or erroneous, requested instruction directs the court’s attention to an issue which the jury has not been instructed upon but which is necessary to enable the jury to intelligently determine the case, 'the court’s error in failing to charge may not be excused by technical defects in a request to charge’"
- relying on the gravamen rule to find a tort duty
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Disapproved — as noted by a later court
427 P.2d 833 have been disapproved sub silentio to the extent that they would have permitted an action for tort by one claiming only economic loss.
in partmedium confidence
The opinion
NESBETT, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I concur in the result. the maj ority reaches, although I am not in accord with *844 the method of disposing of the question of the limiting instruction.
It is my understanding that the majority opinion is not intended to modify that portion of Civil Rule 51(a) which states:
No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.
The objection registered by appellant to the failure of the court to give the requested instruction has been found by this court to have satisfied the above quoted portion of Civil Rule 51(a). The court has also found that a limiting instruction similar to the requested instruction should have been given under the requirements of that portion of Civil Rule 51(b) which states:
The court shall instruct the jury on all matters of law which it considers necessary for their information in giving their verdict.
In my opinion, the foregoing would be all that need be said on the issue. The ambiguity of the majority opinion in its present form and the factual inapplicability of many of the authorities cited in footnotes 8 and'9 will require clarification in the future. 1
. Numerous federal decisions have construed Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similar to the above quoted provisions of Alaska’s Civil Rule 51(a). See e.g., Cherry v. Stedman, 259 F.2d 774, 777-778 (8th Cir. 1958); Nesbit v. Everette, 243 F.2d 59 (5th Cir. 1957); Baltimore & O. R. v. Felgenhauer, 168 F.2d 12, 18 (8th Cir. 1945).