recognizing that “where it is contended that plaintiff’s injuries are too remote as a matter of law, the trial court may be required to decide whether the tortfeasor was legally exempt from foreseeing plaintiff’s injuries in the first place”
How later courts described this case
- recognizing that “where it is contended that plaintiff’s injuries are too remote as a matter of law, the trial court may be required to decide whether the tortfeasor was legally exempt from foreseeing plaintiff’s injuries in the first place”
- noting that in the context of negligent infliction of emotional distress “the term ‘severe emotional distress’ means any emotional or mental disorder, such as, for example, neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, phobia, or any other type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so.”
- reiterating that “ ‘the mind is no less a part of the person than the body, and the sufferings of the former are sometimes more acute and lasting than those of the latter. Indeed, the sufferings of each frequently, if not usually, act reciprocally on the other.’ ”
- noting that reasonable foreseeability tests for bystander recovery under NIED “are conscientious efforts to avoid what would otherwise become a tort-feasor’s unlimited liability to any bystander suffering foreseeable serious emotional distress.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice WEBB
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority, in order to reach the result it has reached, says it has followed “the overwhelming weight of this Court’s opinions for the past one hundred years.” In applying this “overwhelming weight” of authority the majority has found it necessary to overrule Hinnant v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120 , 126 S.E. 307 (1925), and seven cases decided by the Court of Appeals. I do not believe the Court of Appeals has been wrong in the way it has interpreted our cases.
I believe the cases relied on by the majority show that in some earlier cases we held that negligent infliction of emotional distress without showing more was actionable. These cases involved principally the negligent delivery of telegrams and the negligent burial of bodies. Morrow v. R.R., 213 N.C. 127 , 195 S.E. 383 (1938); Young v. Telegraph Co., 107 N.C. 370 , 11 S.E. 1044 (1890). As the law developed we held that there must be some impact or physical injury accompanying the negligent act to support a claim. Stanback v. Stanback, 297 N.C. 181 , 254 S.E.2d 611 ; Williamson *319 v. Bennett, 251 N.C. 498 , 112 S.E.2d 48 ; Hinnant v. Power Co., 189 N.C. 120 , 126 S.E. 307 ; Kimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 399 , 55 S.E. 778 (1906); Byrd, Recovery For Mental Anguish In North Carolina, 58 N.C. L. Rev. at 457. We have now overruled or disapproved these cases, which I do not think we should do. The rule we have followed is somewhat arbitrary but it is based on the policy that there must be some limit to the liability of a negligent person. I would hold that Glenn W. Johnson and Barbara K. Johnson have not stated claims.