G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co.

BAKES, Chief Justice,

concurring specially:

I concur with all of the majority opinion except a small, but fairly important, part of the standard of review analysis dealing with the plaintiff’s clear and convincing burden of proof. Since in this case it makes no difference whether you apply the clear and convincing evidence standard in these summary judgment proceedings or the preponderance of the evidence standard, the issue is probably moot. When the evidence is viewed most favorably toward G & M Farms, the party opposing summary judgment, under either standard “the moving party is [not] entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” I.R.C.P. 56(c), and therefore this case must be remanded for a trial. Accordingly, I concur in the *528 Court’s opinion with the following reservation.

As to the issue of whether or not the trial court should evaluate the evidence on summary judgment by the same standard which the plaintiff G & M Farms must prove at trial, it seems clear under Rule 56(c) and from our prior decision in Weimer v. Rankin, 117 Idaho 566 , 790 P.2d 347 (1990), that the trial court should evaluate the evidence on summary judgment by the same standard which he must evaluate the evidence at trial in ruling on a motion for directed verdict. If at trial plaintiff must prove its case by clear and convincing evidence, as it must in this ease, then the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary judgment should evaluate the evidence by the same standard. Admittedly, the evidence must be viewed most favorably to the non-moving party, and all conflicting evidence and inferences must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. However, when that is done and when the evidence, viewed that way, still demonstrates that a directed verdict would have to be granted against a party at trial because he has not established his case by clear and convincing evidence (if it is the kind of a case which requires clear and convincing evidence) then summary judgment ought to be granted. Weimer v. Rankin, supra. Our decision in Kline v. Clinton, 103 Idaho 116 , 645 P.2d 350 (1982), does not, in my view, hold otherwise. The holding of the Court in Kline was that, “[A]t the summary judgment stage the function of the trial court is not to weigh the evidence or to try the factual issues by whatever standard is appropriate to the case, but merely to determine whether or not there exists any genuine issue of material fact as adduced from the entire record.” 103 Idaho at 121 , 645 P.2d at 355 (emphasis added). If there are no factual disputes, or if the facts are disputed but nevertheless viewing the facts most favorably to the non-moving party the record still demonstrates that the plaintiff’s evidence is insufficient to survive a directed verdict, then the standard of Rule 56(c) has been met and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

However, in this case, viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiff G & M Farms, and even applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, this record shows that the plaintiff G & M Farms’ evidence would survive a directed verdict, and therefore it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment. Accordingly, I concur in the majority opinion.