When the originator of the defamatory statement has reason to believe that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third person, the originator is responsible for that publication.
How later courts described this case
- When the originator of the defamatory statement has reason to believe that the person defamed will be under a strong compulsion to disclose the contents of the defamatory statement to a third person, the originator is responsible for that publication.
- “Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his 3Under North Dakota law, which the parties also reference, the required elements of an IIED claim are essentially identical: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct that is (2) intentional or reckless and that causes (3) severe emotional distress.” G.K.T. v. T.L.T., 798 N.W.2d 872, 874 (N. Dak. 2011) (quoting Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 923-24 (N. Dak. 1989)). resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”
- endorsing liability for both original publishers and defendants that republish defamatory statements
- where there are factual disputes in the record and varying inferences that can be drawn from those facts, summary judgment may not enter and issue in dispute must be left for jury to decide
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROVIRA, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in the judgment of the majority except as to Part III. I do not agree that Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 comment k (1977), was intended to govern “compelled self-publication.” On this issue I agree with the observations made by Justice Erickson in footnote 4 of his concurring and dissenting opinion. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals on the defamation claim. In all other respects I join the majority opinion.