holding that employees may be similarly situated if their claims are merely “unified by common theories of defendants’ statutory violations, even if the proofs of these theories are inevitably individualized and distinct” and that the plaintiff is not required to show that employees’ claims accrued “in the approximate manner of the named plaintiff’
How later courts described this case
- holding that employees may be similarly situated if their claims are merely “unified by common theories of defendants’ statutory violations, even if the proofs of these theories are inevitably individualized and distinct” and that the plaintiff is not required to show that employees’ claims accrued “in the approximate manner of the named plaintiff’
- concluding that a district court should not apply the sham affidavit rule when “the alleged inconsistency created by the affidavit existed within the deposition itself ” (quoting Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 894 (5th Cir. 1980))
- holding that, because of the Act’s remedial purposes, FLSA’s “similarly situated” standard is less stringent than that applied in a Rule 23 analysis
- holding that “the plaintiffs were similarly situated, because their claims were unified by common theories of defendants’ statutory violations,” namely, “forcing employees to work off the clock and improperly editing time-sheets”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663 (2016)
575 F.3d 567, 584 (6th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 577 U.S. 153
The opinion
WHITE, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part.
I concur in the majority opinion except with regard to its determination that the Dellarussiani plaintiffs’ common-law claims in O’Brien are necessarily barred by res judicata. I would leave such a determination to the district court on remand.