50% acceptance rate of African-American jurors — six out of twelve tendered — failed to establish prima facie showing of discrimination
How later courts described this case
- 50% acceptance rate of African-American jurors — six out of twelve tendered — failed to establish prima facie showing of discrimination
- “Arrest of judgment is the act of staying or withholding judgment for errors appearing on the face of the record.”
- court’s instruction was proper where judge stated that defendants could be found guilty of rape and sex offense if they employed a deadly weapon or were aided and abetted
- possibility that jury relied on unsupported theory to convict defendant required new trial
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647 (1997)
318 N.C. 141, 164 , 347 S.E.2d 755, 769 (1986), overruled on other grounds, State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647 , 483 S.E.2d 396
Distinguished
Distinguished by State v. Young, 319 N.C. 661 (1987)
318 N.C. 141, 347 S.E. 2d 755 (1986), the case upon which defendant relies, is inapposite.
The opinion
Justice MARTIN
dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent from part of the reasoning and conclusion of section III.C. of the majority’s opinion.
Preliminarily, I note that on page 31 of its slip opinion the majority relies upon State v. Midyette, 270 N.C. 229 , 154 S.E. 2d 66 (1967), without acknowledging that, in response to recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, Midyette was expressly overruled by State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 454 , 340 S.E. 2d 701, 708 (1986). Accord State v. Freeland, 316 N.C. 13, 23 , 340 S.E. 2d 35, 41 (1986).
In the instant case the jury found that Belton and Sadler were both guilty of rape and kidnapping of the victim Nunnery. Because in each defendant’s case the rape of Nunnery was the only possible “sexual assault” establishing the fifth element of kidnapping in the first degree, I agree under the Freeland and Mason cases (a) that either Belton’s conviction of rape of Nunnery must be vacated or his conviction of kidnapping be reduced from kidnapping in the first degree to kidnapping in the second degree and (b) that either Sadler’s conviction of rape of Nunnery must be *168 vacated or his conviction of kidnapping be reduced from kidnapping in the first degree to kidnapping in the second degree.
I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusions (a) that Belton’s convictions of one count of rape of White, one count of sexual assault of White, and one count of kidnapping of White cannot stand simultaneously, and (b) that Sadler’s convictions of one count of rape of White, one count of sexual assault of White, and one count of kidnapping of White cannot stand simultaneously. Had the record showed that the “sexual assault” of White which provided the fifth element of kidnapping in the first degree been either the crime of rape or of sexual offense of which each defendant was convicted separately, I would agree with the majority’s conclusion. See Freeland. Here, however, there was substantial evidence of a second rape by Sadler of White with Belton aiding and abetting — of which rape neither defendant was convicted — which provided proof sufficient to establish the fifth element. White testified that after Sadler forced her at gunpoint to disrobe and to lie on the ground with her legs spread,
A. [H]e raped me.
Q. Did any part of him enter any part of you at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What part of him entered what part of you?
A. His penis entered my vagina.
Q. Was that with your consent?
A. No, sir, it was not.
Q. What happened next?
A. He then, after a couple of minutes, he told me to spread my legs again and he raped me again vaginaily.
This situation is virtually identical to that of State v. Price, 313 N.C. 297 , 327 S.E. 2d 863 (1985), in which this Court held unanimously that evidence of an unindicted sexual assault of the victim was sufficient to support the fifth element of kidnapping in the first degree. This issue having been squarely considered and de *169 cided by this Court just last year, it should not be so lightly overruled.
The salutary need for certainty and stability in the law requires, in the interest of sound public policy, that the decisions of a court of last resort affecting . . . social values, deliberately made after ample consideration, should not be disturbed, under the doctrine of stare decisis, except for the most cogent reasons ....
1 Strong’s N.C. Index 3d Appeal and Error § 69 (1976) (footnotes omitted). For this reason I dissent.
Justices Meyer and Mitchell join in this dissenting opinion.