noting rule that it is within the discretion of the court to issue constitutional writs
How later courts described this case
- noting rule that it is within the discretion of the court to issue constitutional writs
- granting constitutional certiorari is always discretionary with the superior court and cannot be mandated by anyone, including a higher court; refusal to exercise inherent powers of review must be accompanied by tenable reasons for the refusal
- noting that review by constitutional writ of certiorari "is rarely granted where a petitioner has failed to take advantage of another avenue of review without an adequate excuse"
- “The superior court may in its discretion refuse to exercise its inherent powers of review so long as tenable reasons are given to support that discretionary ruling.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Coleman, J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully dissent. I do not agree with the majority's assertion that statements in Des-chenes v. King Cy., 83 Wn.2d 714 , 521 P.2d 1181 (1974) regarding jurisdictional time limits apply only to RCW 7.16 writs of certiorari and not to writs of certiorari sought pursuant to the court's inherent power to review administrative actions. The Deschenes court specifically held:
The constitutional provision giving to the superior courts jurisdiction to issue writs, Const, art 4, § 6, does not prohibit the limitation of the time for seeking such a *255 writ. The rule is recognized in R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 21.15 (1968), as follows:
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act contains a provision that a petition to review a decision of a board of adjustment "shall be presented to the court within 30 days after the filing of the decision in the office of the board." Specific provisions limiting the time within which an aggrieved litigant must perfect an appeal are included in the enabling acts of about two-thirds of the states.
In general, these provisions are included on the assumption that the public interest will be best served by finalizing the decisions of the board and firming-up the rights to develop land at the earliest moment which is consistent with fair process. . . . The time restrictions range from 10 to 60 days,. . .
The time limitations imposed by statute upon the commencement of proceedings to review a decision of a board of adjustment are regarded as mandatory. Failure to initiate proceedings within the time limited by statute results in loss of the right of review.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Deschenes, at 716-17.
I also disagree with the majority's contention that Pierce Cy. Sheriff v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 98 Wn.2d 690 , 658 P.2d 648 (1983) and Williams v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 97 Wn.2d 215 , 643 P.2d 426 (1982) cast doubt upon or depart from the holding in Deschenes. In Pierce Cy. Sheriff, there was no direct appeal provision, nor was there a right to appeal under RCW 7.16.040. Under these circumstances, review was proper under the court's inherent power of review. In Williams , there was an express statutory bar to judicial review. Additionally, the administrative action at issue was not quasi judicial, and review was not available by writ of certiorari pursuant to RCW 7.16.040. Under these circumstances, the court recognized a constitutional right to judicial review pursuant to the court's inherent power. Neither case involved an express statutory right of appeal or a right to seek review by a writ of certiorari pursuant to RCW 7.16. Consequently, the cases do not in any way undermine the *256 holding in Deschenes.
Bellevue City Code 20.40.180 provides for an appeal which must be taken within a specified period of time. Appellants did not comply with these time constraints, and therefore, the Superior Court acted correctly in refusing to entertain the writ. 5
The court should resort to its inherent powers only when express statutory authority impinges upon its ability to carry out its function. This is not a case where a legislative body has attempted to isolate itself from review and thus interfere with the court's ability to review arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful administrative action. For the reasons stated herein, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Because I believe that the Superior Court did not have authority to review the matter pursuant to its inherent powers, it is unnecessary to discuss whether appellants' failure to specifically request review under the court's inherent powers should preclude their argument here. In my view, however, it is particularly unfortunate to recognize a right to review under an inherent power theory when that argument was not advanced to the trial court.