noting that, generally, "[i]nformation that emerges after the warrant is issued has no bearing" on the probable cause analysis
How later courts described this case
- noting that, generally, "[i]nformation that emerges after the warrant is issued has no bearing" on the probable cause analysis
- holding that the officers were required to stop their search once they realized the building in question was not a single-family residence, as they had originally believed
- noting that “[exclusion is not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation, and the benefits of exclusion must outweigh the costs.” (citing Herring v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009))
- noting that “[e]xclusion is not a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation, and the benefits of exclusion must outweigh the costs.” (citing Herring v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 695, 700 (2009))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the holding and the reasoning of the majority’s thorough opinion, but I cannot concur in the substantial dicta devoted to attacking the exclusionary rule. This is a civil case; nothing incriminating was discovered during this illegal search, and no criminal charges ensued. There is thus nothing to exclude. The continued vitality of the exclusionary rule is a matter solely for the Supreme Court to consider. It is a far-reaching issue that would benefit from full argument, and should not be blithely dismissed absent that full presentation. Because it is not our province to comment on issues not before the court, I *400 do not join that part of the majority’s opinion. See Idris v. City of Chicago, Ill., 552 F.3d 564, 567 (7th Cir.2009). (“federal courts do not issue advisory opinions on situations that do not affect the litigants”).