holding that “creation of a unified state bar was properly a judicial function for the highest court in our judicial department”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “creation of a unified state bar was properly a judicial function for the highest court in our judicial department”
- “That the courts possess certain inherent powers is a proposition which, so far as we know, has never been questioned. This means, then, when the [Georgia] Constitution declares that the legislative, judicial and executive powers shall forever remain separate and distinct . . . it thereby invests those officials charged with the duty of administering justice according to law with all necessary authority to efficiently and completely discharge those duties the performance of which is by the Constitution committed to the judiciary, and to maintain the dignity and independence of the courts.” (cleaned up)
- “[T]hat the legislature has in the past enacted statutes concerning the practice is entered the attorney involved may elect to have any material issues of fact determined by a jury in the superior court of the county of his residence.” 9 of law [does not] indicate that such is a legislative function. This court’s recognition of such legislative enactments . . . does not mean that this court intended to, or even could relinquish this judicial responsibility to the legislature.”
- Judicial power “includes the authority to perform any function reasonably necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, improve the administration of justice, and protect the judiciary as an independent department of the government.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Nichols, Justice,
dissenting. I dissent from Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion, as well as the judgment of affirmance.
Assuming, but not deciding that the creation of the State Bar of Georgia can withstand every attack made upon its constitutionality in this case, yet, at the time of the creation of the State Bar of Georgia all attorneys, duly licensed to practice law in this State, continued to be duly licensed until such time as they might have been suspended, disbarred, or otherwise had their licenses revoked.
Rule 1-501 provides: “License Fees — Each member of the State Bar of Georgia shall pay to the State Bar of Georgia a license fee which shall be due on January 1 of each year and upon his failure to do so, such member shall be given notice by mail by January 15 that his license fee has not been received and, if he fails to pay the same by March 1, he shall be suspended until all such license fees for the current and prior years shall have been paid, whereupon he shall automatically be reinstated.” 219 Ga. 882 .
The only logical interpretation of such rule is that some affirmative action must be taken before any suspension can result. Admittedly the appellant was duly licensed to practice *114 law in this State at the time of the creation of the State Bar of Georgia, and the State Bar of Georgia, through its proper officers, having failed to take any affirmative action to suspend the appellant, it cannot be said that the practice of law by him for the three years next preceding his election as solicitor general (district attorney) was illegal.
I am authorized to state that Justice Frankum concurs in this dissent.