holding that release of “ ‘any responsibility [of defendant] whatsoever, of any kind’ ” for Honda-Civic released plaintiff’s claim that defendant, prior to plaintiff’s signing release, fraudulently concealed damage he had caused to car
How later courts described this case
- holding that release of “ ‘any responsibility [of defendant] whatsoever, of any kind’ ” for Honda-Civic released plaintiff’s claim that defendant, prior to plaintiff’s signing release, fraudulently concealed damage he had caused to car
- stating the same general rule, and distinguishing plaintiff’s case from that in Travis because plaintiff’s claim against defendant had accrued when she signed the release
- “The document clearly and unambiguously informs the reader that it is a release by the signatory of ‘any responsibility [of defendant] whatsoever, of any kind for my 85 Honda-Civic.’ Any responsibility of defendant to plaintiff was already in existence at the time plaintiff signed the document and was therefore released by that document.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Frye
dissenting.
The majority concludes that the trial court did not err in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claim, holding that the document in this case is effective as a release of plaintiff’s claim against defendant. I believe that the forecast of evidence in this case, viewed properly, presented a question of fact for the jury as to whether defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to sign the release. Thus, defendant, as the moving party, was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
We have held that summary judgment should be “granted when, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party *166 is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 326 N.C. 771, 774 , 392 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1990) (quoting Beckwith v. Llewellyn, 326 N.C. 569, 573 , 391 S.E.2d 189, 191 , reh’g denied, 327 N.C. 146 , 394 S.E.2d 168 (1990)). In order to be entitled to summary judgment, the moving party must bear the burden of showing that no questions of material fact remain to be resolved. Id.
Without, unnecessary duplication, the forecast of evidence, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the non-moving party, shows that after defendant had serviced plaintiffs Honda automobile, plaintiff returned the automobile to defendant when she noticed a peculiar odor and carpet stains. Defendant inspected the automobile and did not disclose to plaintiff that her automobile’s fuel line had been damaged. Instead, defendant told plaintiff that the odor was probably residual smell from the welding. Defendant assured plaintiff that the odor would dissipate and denied knowledge of the origin of the stains. Relying on defendant’s assessment of the problem, plaintiff obtained an estimate for shampooing the carpet.
Thereafter, plaintiff telephoned defendant and asked him for a contribution towards having the carpet shampooed. Defendant became very upset during the conversation and agreed to refund plaintiff’s $30.00 payment as his contribution. Plaintiff and defendant agreed that plaintiff would sign a “receipt” for the $30.00 refund. Defendant refused to meet with plaintiff that day, claiming that he was too busy at work. Therefore, they agreed to meet the following week.
However, almost immediately following their telephone conversation, defendant unexpectedly appeared at plaintiff’s work place at a time when plaintiff was very busy with customers. Defendant gave plaintiff $30.00 and presented a document for plaintiff’s signature. Defendant never revealed that the document was anything other than a receipt for his contribution towards having the carpet shampooed as they had agreed during their prior telephone conversation.
When neither the odor nor the stains dissipated, plaintiff took her automobile to a Honda dealership. The mechanic there informed plaintiff that the fuel line had been damaged to the point of leakage by a welding device near the clutch cable. The mechanic found the damage to be readily apparent. The mechanic informed plaintiff that the automobile was in a very dangerous condition and that she was extremely lucky that there had been no explosion.
*167 The majority holds that the “receipt” signed by plaintiff is effective as a release of plaintiffs claim against defendant. However, a release procured by fraud or misrepresentation is invalid. Cunningham v. Brown, 51 N.C. App. 264 , 276 S.E.2d 718 (1981). Indeed, the principle is often stated, in broad and sweeping language, that fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters, and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments. See generally 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 8 (1968). A pleading setting up fraud must allege the facts relied upon to constitute fraud, and that the alleged false representation was made with intent to deceive plaintiff, or must allege facts from which such intent can be legitimately inferred. Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129 , 97 S.E.2d 881 (1957).
I believe that the allegations of the complaint, and the materials presented to and considered by the trial court on the motion for summary judgment, are sufficient to permit a legitimate inference of intent to deceive. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as we are bound to do, I conclude that the forecast of evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant fraudulently induced plaintiff to sign the release. Accordingly, I would hold that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the Court of Appeals, therefore, erred in affirming the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Justice LAKE and Justice ORR join in this dissenting opinion.