"state cannot be sued without its consent and then only in the manner and to the extent provided by statute”
How later courts described this case
- "state cannot be sued without its consent and then only in the manner and to the extent provided by statute”
- the State is not liable for interest on judgments against it unless a statute authorizes such payment or the reasonable construction of a contract or statute places the State in a position of liability
- "state cannot be sued without its consent and then only in the manner and to the extent *390 provided by statute”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Weaver, J.
(dissenting ) Counsel have been most diligent. They have made available to us a plethora of statutes, constitutional provisions, and judicial decisions of other jurisdictions that have considered the problem before us. It would be a futile task, extending this dissent beyond reasonable bounds, and would serve no useful purpose to make a detailed analysis of the authorities because of the myriad differences among them.
As this court pointed out in Kelso v. Tacoma, 63 Wn.2d 913, 918 , 390 P.2d 2 (1964), the legislature has clearly indicated its intention to change the public policy of the state by its adoption of the state’s Torts Claims Act; and we noted in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wn.2d 246, 252 , 407 P.2d 440 (1965), that “the legislature intended to abolish on a broad basis the doctrine of sovereign tort immunity in this state” for the doctrine “is no longer desirable or acceptable.” Finch v. Matthews, 74 Wn.2d 161, 176 , 443 P.2d 833 (1968).
It is apparent that when the state consented to submit to tort liability, as it is authorized to do by article 2, section 26 of the state constitution, it placed itself in the same position as other litigants, and, like them, rendered itself liable upon any judgment the court might determine from the facts.
Although the state’s power to control and regulate the right of suit against it is plenary, and it may annex such *259 conditions thereto as it deems wise (State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 688 , 151 Pac. 108 (1915)), I do not find that it has excluded interest upon a judgment from its liability.
A different question might have been presented had a period been placed after the word “conduct” so that the statute (RCW 4.92.090) would have read: “The state of Washington . . . shall be liable for damages arising out of its tortious conduct.” We believe, however, that the phrase “to the same extent as if it were a private person or corporation” is meaningful. I cannot read it out of the statute.
A judgment founded upon tort liability of a “private person or corporation” bears interest pursuant to statute (RCW 4.56.110); so should such a judgment against the state.
Thus, I believe that the state of Washington, pursuant to RCW 4.92.090, is liable for the payment of interest on a tort judgment entered against it.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Hunter, C. J., Finley, J., and Armstrong, J. Pro Tem., concur with Weaver, J.
August 8, 1969. Petition for rehearing denied.