holding that “successful party” entitled to attorney’s fees in contractual action may include one “who achieve[s] reversal of an unfavorable interim order if that order is central to the case and if the appeal process finally determines an issue of law sufficiently significant that the appeal may be considered as a separate unit”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “successful party” entitled to attorney’s fees in contractual action may include one “who achieve[s] reversal of an unfavorable interim order if that order is central to the case and if the appeal process finally determines an issue of law sufficiently significant that the appeal may be considered as a separate unit”
- holding that “to be timely under Rule 21(c) on petitions for review by this court, the request for attorney’s fees must be made either in the petition for review, the response thereto or by separate written motion filed and served pri- or to oral argument”
- holding the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract “requires that neither party do anything that will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of them agreement”
- holding Arizona courts "concur in the Restatement’s rejection of the formalistic privilege concept in favor of a requirement that an interference be 'improper' for liability to attach."
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Superseded by statute, as recognized in Powell v. Washburn
710 P.2d 1025, 1041-42 (Ariz. 1985) (relying upon, inter alia, Truax and Comment g to Restatement to recognize cause of action for intentional interference with “any contract, at-will or otherwise,” including at-will employment contract), superseded in part by statute on other grounds as stated in Galati v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 69 P.3d 1011, 1013
The opinion
HOLOHAN, Chief Justice,
specially concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the principles set forth in the majority opinion, but I disagree that plaintiffs attorney should be allowed attorney’s fees for services on the petition for review.
This is not an instance when counsel was confused about proper procedure. Plaintiff’s counsel failed to request attorney’s fees in the Court of Appeals in the manner required by Rule 21, Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure. If a timely request for attorney’s fees had been made in the Court of Appeals, I could agree that there was diligence by counsel, and the confusion about the manner of applying for fees on review deserved our special consideration. The record in this case does not support our giving any special consideration to counsel. I would deny the request for attorney’s fees.