holding that, in reviewing reasonableness of sentence, “we do not consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor,” but rather “whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, in reviewing reasonableness of sentence, “we do not consider what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor,” but rather “whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case”
- explaining that the weight that the district court places on a particular factor need not be the weight that this Court would assign, so long as “the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.”
- recognizing that upon identification of procedural error “one proper course” is to remand so district court “can either explain what it was trying to do, or correct its mistake and exercise its discretion anew” rather than proceed to review for substantive reasonableness
- holding that district court’s substantive determination will be set aside only in “exceptional cases” where sentence imposed “ ‘cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions’ ” (quoting United States v. Rigas, 490 F.3d 208, 238 (2d Cir.2007))
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KATZMANN, Circuit Judge,
with whom CABRANES, SACK, and HALL, Circuit Judges, join, concurring:
I concur in Judge Calabresi’s thoughtful and comprehensive assessment of the landscape following the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gall and Kimbrough. In par *198 ticular, I agree that the Supreme Court limited the Courts of Appeals’ role in reviewing sentences, whether they vary above or below the applicable Guidelines range, so long as a district court’s rationale for a sentence is discernible and reasonable. I also agree with Judge Cala-bresi that, despite Gall and Kimbrough, we still have a role to play in “patrolling] the outer boundaries of reasonableness.” Fixing those boundaries is ultimately an exercise of judgment, one that cannot be reduced to a simple formula or applied mechanically.
Undoubtedly, this and other Courts of Appeals will someday vacate sentences on the ground that a district court’s reasoning is so unpersuasive as to render it unreasonable. As I read the Supreme Court’s decisions, this is not such a case. I write separately to note simply that an appellate court need not, in the end, find a district court’s reasoning compelling in order to affirm. Were we charged with adjudicating a policy debate, the dissenters might well prevail. But I do not think that is a task the Supreme Court would have us undertake. Rather, I understand the Supreme Court to mean we must defer to the district court’s assessment so long as it is “reasonable.” Courts will have to determine in individual eases the line at which reasonableness ends and arbitrariness begins, with the twin hobgoblins of widely variant sentences and overbearing circuit-court review lurking in the shadows. Ultimately, however, in light of the Supreme Court’s directives, I do not think that this is a case in which the district court has crossed that line.
Accordingly, I concur.