dismissing a direct appeal from a probation revocation arising from defendant’s first offender status
How later courts described this case
- dismissing a direct appeal from a probation revocation arising from defendant’s first offender status
- the discretionary appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5) is applicable to the revocation of “first offender” probation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
McMurray, Presiding Judge.
This is a direct appeal from an order of adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence in a first offender case. The two enumerations of error complain of the sentence imposed on defendant Zamora following the revocation of his probation. Held:
In Dean v. State, 177 Ga. App. 123, 124 (1) ( 338 SE2d 711 ), this Court concluded that the discretionary appeal procedure of OCGA § 5-6-35 is applicable to the revocation of “first-offender” probation. OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (5). And this rule has been previously recognized in an appeal where all issues related only to the sentence imposed rather than to the revocation of probation. Tallant v. State, 187 Ga. App. 138 ( 369 SE2d 789 ). Thus, Zamora’s failure to comply with those requisite discretionary procedures deprive this Court of jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The appeal must be dismissed. *106 Merciers v. State, 212 Ga. App. 424 ( 444 SE2d 416 ).
Decided March 12, 1997
Reconsideration denied April 7, 1997
Before Judge Caldwell.
Peter J. Ross, Larry H. Tatum, for appellant.
William T. McBroom III, District Attorney, Randall K. Coggin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
Appeal dismissed.
Smith, J., concurs. Beasley, J., concurs specially.