noting that exhaustion is not required for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because "[r]elief under the Civil Rights Act provides a supplemental remedy to any state remedy and relief under the act may not be defeated because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided under state law"
How later courts described this case
- noting that exhaustion is not required for suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because "[r]elief under the Civil Rights Act provides a supplemental remedy to any state remedy and relief under the act may not be defeated because of failure to exhaust administrative remedies provided under state law"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DOOLIN, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority bases its decision to reverse the Court of Appeals and thus the trial court, on Mary Jane’s failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. If this rule of administrative law is followed, Mary Jane was precluded from seeking relief through the district court because she did not appeal the decision of the Professional Practices Commission to the State Board of Education.
This well settled law of exhaustion of remedies consists of many exceptions. Premature judicial review is permitted if the question of substantive or procedural due process is raised if there is a constitutional question that will remain no matter what the agency does, Public Utilities Commission v. U. S., 355 U.S. 534 , 78 S.Ct. 446 , 2 L.Ed.2d 470 (1958); if the appeals would be futile, Wolff v. Selective Service Board No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967); or if the agency actions could cause irreparable injury to the party, Isbrandtsen Co. Inc. v. United States, 93 U.S.App.D.C. 293 , 211 F.2d 51 (1954).
The Harrah School Board’s rules provided only that if Mary Jane did not continue her education past her Bachelor’s degree she would not be granted a salary increment. There was no provision in these rules or in her contract that would give her notice that non-renewal of her contract was the penalty for her failure to return to school. She was notified by letter on September 13, 1973, after her contract was signed and after the school year had com *1377 menced that her contract would not be renewed the following year if she did not continue her schooling. Mary Jane argues that this addition of an unwritten penalty of nonrenewal is a violation of due process. She claims the Harrah Board was without legal authority in refusing to renew her contract on a ground not stated in the statutes, her contract or the published rules of the Board.
The trial court, upheld by the Court of Appeals found that this was a violation of due process in that anything as drastic as non-renewal of a tenured teacher’s contract should be in the rules and in her contract.
The majority holds that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide this question and that her only recourse was through the statutory procedures of appeal provided in the statute. I do not agree.
An opinion by our Attorney General, #73-267 issued September 11, 1973, specifically advises us that “procedural due process questions are not properly before the State Board of Education or the Professional Practices Commission acting pursuant to said section ( 70 O.S. 6 -122), such questions being left to the courts. The only issue before them is whether or not sufficient cause existed for her non-renewal.”
If the Professional Practices Commission may not decide the due process issues, and the majority holds today that Mary Jane is precluded from seeking relief through our courts, who then may consider the due process issues she has raised ?
The facts in this case are undisputed. Mary Jane did not return to school. The Harrah School Board claims her failure to continue her education is willful neglect of duty. Mary Jane has been a teacher for twelve years. There is no contention by the Board that Mary Jane is not a good teacher. Both parties agree that she has outstanding ability and handles her duties very satisfactorily. Only questions of law remain. No exhaustion of remedies is required in respect to questions of law. Nolan v. Fitzpatrick, 9 N.J. 477 , 89 A.2d 13 (1952). The doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is neither jurisdictional nor an absolute requirement. If the issues raised are purely legal and the facts raising the issue are undisputed, an action should not be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Merry Heart Nursing and Convalescent Home Inc. v. Dougherty, 131 N.J.Super. 412 , 330 A.2d 370 (1974).
The majority quotes at length from McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 , 89 S.Ct. 1657 , 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969). The petitioner in that case had failed to take an administrative appeal and the government argued that this prevented him from obtaining any judicial relief even though it was not too late to go back and repair the error by asking for an appeal. However, because of the extreme harshness of the mle, the Court did not require exhaustion of remedies and granted him relief.
As the majority states, one of the reasons listed in McKart for requiring exhaustion of remedies is that administrative agencies have special expertise in their field. But in our case the issues before us concern questions of law which are not peculiarly within the expertise of the Commission and State Board of Education. See Thomas v. Bergen County Welfare Board, 122 N.J.Super. 371 , 300 A.2d 575 (1973).
In Lovelace v. Ingram, 518 P.2d 1102 (Okl.1973), a case similar to this one, this Court granted a writ of mandamus against the Hinton Board of Education requiring it to reinstate a tenured teacher for the following school year. The writ of mandamus was considered the proper remedy to raise the issue of sufficient cause and due process. See French, Oklahoma’s Tenure Law: Revisited 45 O.B.J. 473 which upholds this view.
We realize that the statute has been amended since Lovelace . 70 O.S. (Supp. 1973) 6-122 contains a provision that on appeal if the Board finds that a teacher was dismissed without sufficient cause the *1378 contract shall be automatically extended for one year. This still does not encompass the issues of due process and would not alter the holding that only a court of law has the authority to rule on the due process issue. The commission is still limited to questions of cause.
A teacher is a government employee and his interest in his continued employment is a protectible “property interest” and therefore, any termination is subject to procedural and substantive safeguards. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 , 92 S.Ct. 2694 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Being fired for willful neglect of duty places a stigma on Mary Jane and this too could be an infringement of “liberty and hence due process.” See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Every person should be afforded the opportunity to challenge, in a court of law, the deprivation of his constitutional rights by any governmental agency even a local school board.
As a tenured teacher Mary Jane has a right to have her contract renewed ad in-finitum. Even with the extension provision added in the 1973 amendment, all the State Board of Education may do is renew her contract for one year. Thus this route of administrative appeal is inadequate to protect her right to continued employment.
As a tenured teacher non-renewal is not the denial of a privilege but a revocation of a right. Statutes which impair constitutional rights, like criminal statutes must always be rigidly construed. Non-renewal provisions being penal in nature must give fair warning of the exact conduct which is outlawed. Rules must be reasonable. This is the essence of substantive due process. Otherwise, a school board could arbitrarily add new rules and new penalties to the regulations already existing at the time the teacher’s contract was signed, and then use a teacher’s failure to conform to these as a basis for termination and call it “willful neglect of duty.”
In an old case, School District No. 25 of Blaine County v. Bear, 106 Okl. 172 , 233 P. 427 (1925) a school teacher had entered into a contract such as Mary Jane’s where she agreed to observe the rules and regulations prescribed by the school board. After teaching for a period of three months, she was discharged for failing to do the janitor work. The school board claimed •that this refusal to build fires and sweep the school house was “incompetence and negligence” which were the statutory grounds for dismissal at that time. The Court held that since there was no such stipulation in the contract, her refusal was not grounds for dismissal.
The penalty of removing Mary Jane’s livelihood is most harsh. If failure to continue one’s education is to be considered willful neglect of duty it must be spelled out clearly, otherwise, the rules of the school board are ambiguous and subject to close constitutional scrutiny as to their validity.
As the Court of Appeals opinion said in our case, “No factual question relating to cause is present. The questions are legal in nature — the validity of the penalty provision and the authority of the board.” These are questions for a court of law to decide, not an administrative agency. The district court decided these questions in Mary Jane’s favor and we feel that it was the proper place for'them to be aired.
One immediate effect of the majority opinion is to grant to the Board of Education, a purely administrative body, judicial power to determine constitutional question of procedural and substantive due process. The State Board of Educations’ make up is fixed by statute 70 O.S.1971 § 3-101, its duties are not judicial or quasi judicial 70 O. S.1971 § 3-104; it is ill equipped to venture into the troubled waters of due process in any degree. To us the majority opinion has the effect of delegating judicial power to an administrative agency unauthorized to exercise same.
*1379 After carefully reviewing and considering the legal questions and weighing the evidence, I find no error in the Court of Appeals’ opinion.
I am authorized to state Justices BERRY and SIMMS concur in this dissenting opinion.