holding that a rezoning did not constitute a taking under the North Carolina Constitution and that the rezoning therefore did not constitute a taking under the U.S. Constitution “for the same reasons”
How later courts described this case
- holding that a rezoning did not constitute a taking under the North Carolina Constitution and that the rezoning therefore did not constitute a taking under the U.S. Constitution “for the same reasons”
- one purpose of an option contract is to minimize investment exposure by postponing the decision to accept or reject an offer
- “[T]he test for determining whether a taking has occurred in the context of a rezoning is whether the property as rezoned has a practical use and a reasonable value.” (citations omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice FRYE
dissenting.
I concur in the Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion. The ultimate question before the Court in this case is whether the plaintiffs carried their burden of showing that the rezoning of plaintiffs’ property amounted to a taking under either the North Carolina Constitution or the United States Constitution. The jury found that a taking had occurred. After making findings of fact, the trial court also concluded that a taking had occurred. The majority of the Court now holds that the City of Durham’s motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted, meaning that the evidence was insufficient to go to the jury in the first place. I dissent from that holding.
As the majority notes, plaintiffs’ experts testified that the rezoning of plaintiffs’ property from O-I to R-10 deprived plaintiffs of all practical, beneficial and reasonable use of the property. As the majority further notes, while the plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that the rezoning ordinance deprives plaintiffs of all practical use of the property and renders it of no reasonable value, for purposes of the City of Durham’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, plaintiffs’ evidence must be accepted as true.
The judge must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and may grant the motion only if, as a matter of law, the evidence is insufficient to justify a verdict for the nonmovant. Dickinson v. Pake, 284 N.C. 576 , 201 S.E.2d 897 (1974). All conflicts in the evidence are to be resolved in the nonmovant’s favor, and he must be given the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn in his favor. Daughtry v. Turnage, 295 N.C. 543 , 246 S.E.2d 788 (1978). Conflicts, contradictions, and inconsistencies are to be resolved in the nonmovant’s favor. Summey v. Cauthen, 283 N.C. 640 , 197 S.E.2d 549 (1973).
*389 William v. Jones, 322 N.C. 42, 48 , 366 S.E.2d 433, 437 , reh’g denied, 322 N.C. 486 , 370 S.E.2d 237 (1988). In the instant case, the nonmovants are the plaintiffs. Resolving all of the conflicts, contradictions and inconsistencies in the evidence in plaintiffs’ favor and giving them the benefit of every inference reasonably to be drawn therefrom, I conclude that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury and to sustain a finding that there was in fact a taking. Thus, I dissent from the Court’s holding to the contrary.