“The mental torture element is confined to cases in which the victim is terrorized for a significant period of time before death.”
How later courts described this case
- “The mental torture element is confined to cases in which the victim is terrorized for a significant period of time before death.”
- capital sentencing statute must be read broadly as relating to prison life and society at large
- recognizing trial court's ability to look at entire record when sentencing on a plea
- “[A] guilty plea waives all previous non-jurisdictional defects ....”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PARKS, Judge,
specially concurring:
This Court established guidelines for the taking of guilty pleas in King v. State, 553 P.2d 529 (Okl.Cr.1976). It continues to be the opinion of this writer that these directives should be followed step by step whenever a plea of guilty or nolo conten-dere is entered. If they were, most of the questions concerning reliability of these pleas would be eliminated. As I noted in my separate opinion in Ocampo v. State, 778 P.2d 920, 925 (Okl.Cr.1989), compliance with King “best expedites the interests of justice and promotes finality by foreclosing state and federal collateral attacks.” As a matter of stare decisis, I am bound to apply the “substantial compliance” standard set forth in Ocampo . Notwithstanding, I find that the trial court in the present case properly followed the dictates of King by interrogating petitioner and defense counsel regarding petitioner’s past and present mental state, as well as by observing petitioner’s demeanor before the court. King, 553 P.2d at 534 .
With respect to the “continuing threat” aggravating circumstance, I agree with appellant that more definitive guidance is needed. See Boltz v. State, 806 P.2d 1117, 1126-27 (Okl.Cr.1991) (Parks, P.J., specially concurring). I also agree that “[t]he term ‘society’ must ... be interpreted to encompass prison society if [21 O.S.1981,] § 701.-12(7) is to be evaluated in a non-arbitrary manner.” Id. at 1127. See also Rougeau v. State, 738 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (“the ‘society’ that would exist for the defendant ... would be the ‘society’ that is within the Department of Corrections”). As a matter of stare decisis, however, I must yield my view to that of the majority of this Court, which has held that this aggravating circumstance is specific, not vague, and readily understandable. See Boltz, 806 P.2d at 1117 .
Finally, I reiterate my opinion that the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague both on its face and as applied. See Foster v. State, 779 P.2d 591, 594 (Okl.Cr.1989) (Parks, P.J., specially concurring). However, I yield to the “torture or serious abuse” standard adopted in Stouffer as a matter of stare decisis. Applying this standard to the present case, I agree that the evidence presented concerning the instant murder satisfied this circumstance.