Opinion

State v. Webster

  • 170 Ariz. 372
  • 96 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 131
  • 824 P.2d 768
  • 1991 Ariz. App. LEXIS 242
Court
Court of Appeals of Arizona
Filed
Sep 19, 1991
Status
Published
Author
Livermore
On the bench
Howard, Livermore, Lacagnina
Cited by
19 cases
Authority
More cited than 5.7%

holding that Mimms rule applies equally to both drivers and passengers and even encompasses further order to get back into car

How later courts described this case

  • holding that Mimms rule applies equally to both drivers and passengers and even encompasses further order to get back into car
  • holding that for safety purposes, a passenger may be ordered back into the vehicle during a lawful traffic stop
  • officer may order passenger back inside a lawfully stopped vehicle

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

LIVERMORE, Chief Judge,

dissenting.

Implicit in the court’s ruling is the proposition that in every case in which police may stop a person, even for something as minor as driving with a broken taillight, they may seize anyone with the person stopped. Of course, any time a car is stopped everyone within it is stopped. It does not seem to me to follow, though, that those incidentally stopped are powerless to leave if they wish to and instead must remain involuntarily under police control until the police decide otherwise. Their detention is not supported by reasonable suspicion. The detention, if justified by considerations of officer safety, has to be premised on the notion that any stop creates a significant risk that those associated with the person stopped will attempt to harm the officer. That may be true when the reason for the stop is serious criminal activity. It cannot, it seems to me, be seriously argued that because danger exists sometimes, it must be assumed always to exist so as to justify the seizure of everyone present when anyone is stopped for whatever reason. 1 No argument is made, specific to the facts of this case, that the officer felt the seizure was necessary for his safety. He testified otherwise. In *375 stead it is justified on the broad rule that routine seizures may occur for officer safety regardless of the facts of the case. That rule, permitting wholesale seizures without individual justification, conflicts with the fourth amendment.

. Mimms treats as de minimis an order to one, already properly seized, to get out of a car. That surely cannot be read as treating a seizure itself as de minimis. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.