holding that there is no tort remedy available under OCGA § 16-8-16 for the allegedly unlawful attempt to disseminate information tending to impair appellant’s business because that statute does not create a cause of action in tort in favor of the plaintiff
How later courts described this case
- holding that there is no tort remedy available under OCGA § 16-8-16 for the allegedly unlawful attempt to disseminate information tending to impair appellant’s business because that statute does not create a cause of action in tort in favor of the plaintiff
- holding that “it is clear that the mere filing of a lawsuit is not the type of humiliating, insulting or terrifying conduct which will give rise to a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress”
- holding that there is no tort remedy available under O.C.G.A. § 16-8-16 for the allegedly unlawful attempt to disseminate information tending to impair appellant’s business
- finding O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-2 and 16-8-3 are criminal statutes that do not provide for any private cause of action and dismissing claims under these statutes
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled in part, on other grounds by Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235 (2014)
198 Ga. App. 49, 51 (2) ( 400 SE2d 349 ) (1990) (“[T]he mere filing of a lawsuit is not the type of humiliating, insulting[,] or terrifying conduct which will give rise to a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Sewell v. Cancel, 295 Ga. 235
The opinion
Sognier, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in Divisions 1 through 4, but concur specially with regard to Division 5 and its discussion of the attorney fees award.
The trial court based its award of attorney fees on both paragraphs (a) and (b) of OCGA § 9-15-14. As I discussed more fully in my concurring opinion in Lane v. K-Mart Corp., 190 Ga. App. 113, 115-116 ( 378 SE2d 136 ) (1989), paragraph (a) compels the award of attorney fees only when a claim has merit neither in fact nor in law. As a result, notwithstanding the “any evidence” standard of review enunciated in Haggard v. Bd. of Regents &c. of Ga., 257 Ga. 524, 527 (4) (c) ( 360 SE2d 566 ) (1987), when considering an appeal from an award of attorney fees made under OCGA § 9-15-14 (a), we must determine whether the claim asserted below either had some factual merit or presented a justiciable issue of law. In the case at bar, we effectively engaged in that analysis in our discussion in Division 2 of the merits of the underlying claim. Had we found the claim asserted by appellant constituted a “good faith attempt to establish a new theory of law” as described in OCGA § 9-15-14 (c), the award of attorney fees could not be sustained. Since I agree that the claim advanced below did not meet that standard, I concur in the judgment in Division 5.