explaining that if a statute, such as one criminalizing the use of fighting words, “affects protected speech,” Georgia courts, in reviewing whether the statute is constitutional, must first determine if it is narrowly tailored to protect some vital government interest
How later courts described this case
- explaining that if a statute, such as one criminalizing the use of fighting words, “affects protected speech,” Georgia courts, in reviewing whether the statute is constitutional, must first determine if it is narrowly tailored to protect some vital government interest
- explaining that fighting words are one of the categories of speech that does not “raise constitutional problems provided that the statutes regulating them are narrowly drawn”
- finding a Georgia statute which banned profane language on bumper stickers to be unconstitutional
- clear and present danger doctrine applies only to words “which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Weltner, Justice,
concurring specially.
I agree that the conviction and sentence must be set aside, but would invalidate these on statutory rather than constitutional grounds.
1. OCGA § 40-1-4 provides:
No person owning, operating, or using a motor vehicle in this state shall knowingly affix or attach to any part of such motor vehicle any sticker, decal, emblem, or other device containing profane or lewd words describing sexual acts, excretory functions, or parts of the human body.
Prohibited by this statute are “profane or lewd” words that describe “sexual acts, excretory functions, or parts of the human body.” The meanings of the words “profane” and “lewd” are:
(a) Profane:
(i) 1. Manifesting irreverence or disrespect toward the Deity or sacred things. 2. Not religious or concerned with religious things; secular. 3. Vulgar; common; course. 2 [Funk &
*834 Decided February 22, 1991.
Michael R. Hauptman, Bruce S. Harvey, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, Solicitor, Victoria S. Aronow, Beverly M. Col *835 lins, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee.
*834 Wagnalls Standard Dictionary.]
(ii) Common rather than sacred. Irreverent toward or contemptuous of sacred things. [Ballentine’s Law Dictionary.] Profanity. Calling for or implying divine vengeance or divine condemnation, with or without directly employing the name of the Deity. [Id.]
(b) Lewd:
(i) 1. Characterized by or inciting to lust or debauchery. 2. Obscene; ribald; bawdy. [Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary.]
(ii) Lewdness: The unlawful indulgence of lust; sexual impurity; gross indecency with respect to the sexual relation. [Ballentine’s Law Dictionary.]
(iii) Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 1052 (4th ed. 1968) defines [the word “lewd”] as including “obscene.” [Collins v. State, 160 Ga. App. 680, 681 ( 288 SE2d 43 ) (1981).] 3
2. Because the words in question are neither “profane” (i.e., “sacrilegious”) nor “lewd” (i.e., “obscene”), they do not come within the proscription of OCGA § 40-1-4. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence should be vacated.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Smith and Justice Bell join in this special concurrence.
I doubt that the terms “vulgar,” “common,” and “course” have a sufficient particular *834 ity to define a crime. See Hartrampf v. Ga. Real Estate Comm., 256 Ga. 45 ( 343 SE2d 485 ) (1986), holding the term “unworthiness” to be vague.
To the extent that “lewd” is synonymous with “obscene,” I agree that the display of a bumper sticker exhibiting obscene materials would be prohibited by OCGA § 16-12-80.
Compare Holcombe v. State, 5 Ga. App. 47, 49 ( 62 SE 647 ) (1908), where a statement (“You woman with the big fat rump pointed towards us, get out of the way.”) was found to be “obscene and vulgar” under OCGA § 16-11-39; and Sarnie v. State, 247 Ga. 414 ( 276 SE2d 589 ) (1981), where words (“I hear that you sleep with the faculty. Whore.”) were held not to violate the former Code section proscribing “obscene and vulgar or profane” language in the presence of a female, but violated another subsection proscribing “fighting words.”